This post is also available - with pictures and dancing bears - at Pitchers and Poets. I lied about the bears.
When we construct our little narratives to explain the strange things we see every day, we tend to lump our world into broad categories. Actions are "good" or "bad," "smart" or "dumb." People are "tall" or "short," "happy" or "sad." Sporting events are "entertaining" or "boring." Politicians are "liberal" or "conservative." And so on, a veritable smörgåsbord* of quotated and contrary descriptors. Here at Nicht Diese Tone, of course, we think this stuff is all hogwash. Most of the time, when you're confronted with a duality, it's very probable that you're oversimplifying things. While that oversimplification may be a real time saver - indeed, our ability to do so with such verve and expertise might very well be a key part of our relative evolutionary success - it can also be extremely dangerous.
* Much to my surprise and pleasure, my spell check added the umlaut and the circle thingy over the a.
Much as I'd love to illustrate the point with something profound and socially meaningful, my April-addled mind can't help but turn to baseball as a perfect locus for the issue. The advantage of baseball over things like, say, politics or morality are numerous. The chief reasons, however, are only two: 1) baseball is far less contentious than politics or morality* and 2) baseball is much, much, much easier to quantify, which will help to illustrate the point.
* This is not, strictly speaking, true, as the recent Dodgers-fan led assault against a Giants fan - leaving the man in a coma - attests. Nevertheless, it's much easier for most of us to put aside our sporting-related differences than our political ones.
In particular I want to look at the beloved home of my beloved (and, as of this writing, 12-3) Colorado Rockies, the notorious Coors Field. Coors Field is, in our dualistic narratives, a "hitter's haven." It's a miraculous spa where batting averages go to recover and ERAs go to die, a slugger's wet dream and a scrappy, replacement-level slap hitter's salvation. Otherwise insignificant careers have been forged (Neifi Perez, Juan Pierre), mediocre major leaguers have been saved (Preston Wilson, Kurt Manwaring), over-the-hill sluggers reborn (Jason Giambi), stars made into superstars (Todd Helton, Larry Walker), and aspiring pitchers wrecked (Mike Hampton, Denny Neagle, Pedro Astacio, Daryl Kile, Bret Saberhagen, Greg Harris, and on and on) by its thin air and its cavernous outfield. In the popular narrative of Coors Field, it is an almost mystical place, one man's Heaven and another's Hell, a Miltonian paradox.
Until the advent - and advent is exactly the right word - of the capital-H Humidor, playing at Coors Field was like stepping into a video game. Every decent hitter would hit .350 and slug 40 or 50 homers, as if controlled by some over-obsessive teenager on his X-Box. It was so easy, scores were routinely closer to football (or even basketball) proportions than proper baseball ones.
The Humidor, of course, changed all of that, transforming Coors Field from Bichette's Paradiso to the upper echelons of Purgatorio instead.* No longer a panacea for ailing bats, it became, instead, a kind of minor boost along the lines of many other so-called hitter's parks. Suddenly pitchers with mediocre stuff like Jason Jennings and Jeff Francis could throw complete game shutouts, and Rockies 8-hole hitters stopped hitting above .300. The narrative transformed, enough that Coors Field and Humidor became opposing watchwords, simultaneously an excuse to disparage Rockies hitters for their advantages and mock pitchers for their crude, cigar-inspired handicap.
* I will not apologize for the Dante reference, even though it is also a terrible pun.
Undoubtedly you can tell what I'm going to say, but I'll say it anyway. It's all a bunch of sensationalist nonsense. Because we like to explain the world through clean, discrete, and ultimately meaningless categories Coors Field is painted as a "hitter's park." And it is. The problem is, it's only a marginally better place to hit than anywhere else in baseball. It is, by degree, a better environment for hitters than, say, the Ballpark at Arlington or Fenway Park, but we have created a narrative where it is fundamentally different in kind. Coors Field is a magical place in that narrative, even if its (post-humidor) Park Factor of roughly 115 means that only 15% more runs are scored there than the average stadium (let alone other good hitter's parks).*
* The pre-humidor PF for Coors was, again roughly, 125. Big? Yes. Infinite? Not quite.
This "difference in kind" thinking is responsible for the hullabaloo about the Rockies cheating by storing some balls in the humidor, while keeping others in the dry mountain air in case of late-inning emergency. The difference between the pre-humidor 25% increase in runs and the post-humidor 15% increase in runs is, of course, only 10%. Since, even at Coors, most teams average less than one run an inning, the difference between using the non-humidor balls and the humidor balls in the final inning of a game comes out to somewhere around one extra Rockies run every month (which, we can assume, would lead to maybe one extra win over the course of the entire season). That's a real difference in degree, of course, but that's not the narrative we hold dear.
Instead, as last season drew to a close, the Rockies were accused of cheating, their successes at home pinned on a vast late-inning conspiracy. With humidorized baseballs, the story went, the Rockies were a normal baseball team, capable of scoring runs, yes, but also capable of striking out, hitting into double plays, and regularly stranding runners who reached third with no one out. Bring out non-humidor balls, however, and the Rockies became unstoppable, a force not merely capable of destroying even the best of pitchers, but indeed destined to overcome any deficit, no matter how large. To this way of thinking, the difference between the humidor and non-humidor baseballs was not 10% more runs, but rather "win" instead of "loss." The whole picture became about differences in kind (wins and losses) instead of differences in degree (15% more runs than average and 25% more).
The same, of course, is true about pre-humidor Coors. That Park Factor of 125 is big. Really big. Big enough that the Rockies routinely had one of the worst offenses in Major League Baseball during the early 2000s, and yet were mistakenly believed to have one of the best. But, even with a Park Factor that large, the difference remains one of degree and not kind. While the cumulative effect of a PF of 125 leads to the kind of mis-evaluation that makes Neifi Perez look like an actual Major League baseball player, that is only because the baseball season is 162 games long, and because the actual difference between Albert Pujols and, say, Aaron Miles is much, much, much, much smaller than we usually believe.* Another way of reading, then, that Park Factor of 125 is this: teams that would score 4 runs a game elsewhere scored 5 at Coors. Suddenly that doesn't seem nearly so insane as the narrative of "hitter's paradise" made it sound.
* While Pujols certainly hits more homers than scrappy middle infielders, and by a long shot, his unreal career high in Wins Above Replacement is 10.9. That's epically, historically great. It's also 11 wins out of 162 games, or about 6.8% of the season. I'll let you decide: difference in kind, or difference in degree?
Once our narratives have been constructed, we reinforce them with the stainless steel of confirmation bias. When the Mets come from behind by four in the bottom of the ninth at Shea Stadium (or their new digs, Citi Field), we think of it as a great comeback. When the Rockies come from behind by four in the bottom of the ninth at Coors, we think of it as Coors Field up to its old tricks. A 12-11 slugfest at Kauffman Stadium in Kansas City is the result of bad outings from both teams' pitching staffs. A 12-11 slugfest at Coors Field is the result of the absurd ballpark. The special category of "Coors Field" explains and is the cause of all offense in the Mile High City, while elsewhere it's just normal baseball.
Now don't get me wrong, and allow me to reiterate my point one more time. Coors Field does matter. It used to inflate scoring by 25%, and now inflates scoring by 15%. The Rockies, on the whole, will come from behind to win in the bottom of the ninth more often than other teams. But only very, very slightly more often. The difference is one of degree: the Rockies will score 23 late inning runs for every 20 that a comparable offensive team scores, thanks to playing at Coors. The problem is, our narratives, our categories, our confirmation biases all conspire to make every single run we see at Coors a product of the park, and not of the million other things that go on in a baseball game.
But wait, I'm not done yet. We can apply the same logic to steroids (gasp). While there may be a categorical difference between Barry Bonds, All Time Home Run Champion and Barry Bonds, Great Hitter, we tend to forget that we don't even know exactly how many extra home runs Bonds hit because he used steroids. And we can't know. What's more, we don't know who else benefited, and to what degree. What we do know, however, is that the easiest thing to do is to look at the picture and to discount any player who had a peak season during the "steroid era" as a "cheater," whose whole body of offensive work is attributable exclusively to his steroid use. Rather than imagining that steroids help a player become X% better, we see steroids as being the difference between "good" and "bad," or "great" and "good." We can't even begin to suppose, in our absolutist narrative, that Bonds may well have hit 700+ home runs even without steroids. No, every single home run he mashed is tainted, cheap, unfair. They categorically, absolutely, definitively do not count.
Is that right, though? My answer is no. Of course the steroids issue is a big deal precisely because we do not and cannot know exactly what the effect is, but to imagine that the effect is categorical instead of incremental is absurd. Even if players hit twice as many home runs because of steroids, they didn't hit infinitely times as many. And I think that would be easier to accept if our categories hadn't also been violated. Barry Bonds is not merely a guy who hit X% more homers, but rather is the Home Run King, both in terms of career and single season jacks. Those categories carry far more weight for us than numbers do.
To return to where we started, there's a good reason we think in categories instead of increments, kind instead of degree. It helps us survive. It's better to assume that the unusual ripple in the tall grass we see is dangerous (it might be a tiger) than to assume that said ripple is only marginally more pronounced than usual. In nature, nuance leads to destruction. That's no excuse to turn away from more nuanced thinking, however. If anything, it's an exhortation towards the opposite. That we like to see things as either categorically good or categorically bad makes us easy to persuade and, as a result, hoodwink. If, for example, a politician speaks eloquently to our absolutist moral sensibilities, we're quick to cast our vote in his favor. In the process, we forget that the difference between him and his opposition might not be categorical, but rather incremental, that there are perhaps a range of (non-linear) possible solutions to any given problem instead of two diametrically opposite ones.
The narrative of absolute, dichotomous categories is an extremely dangerous one exactly because it is beautiful. Coors Field as "hitter's haven," human beings as fundamentally good (or bad, as the debate goes), politicians as liberal or conservative, such characterizations make it easier to think, easier to live, easier to write. Poetry may owe itself to complexity, but on some level it also owes itself to simplicity: without a sense of Good and Evil, Joy and Misery, how do we understand No Second Troy? Without the narrative of great plays or bad ones, how do we appreciate an unrepeatable Tulowitzki play in the hole?* The possibility that the narrative value of categories is ultimately empty - of a kind of brute, practical use, but devoid of substantial, metaphysical meaning - is what drives the anti-statistics crowd of baseball fans mad. The reliance upon and manipulation of categories is what makes so many religions so powerful, and - along with hefty doses of confirmation bias - it is what makes Fox News and MSNBC so persuasive to so many Americans.
* Another little pun for which I will not apologize.
Ah, there I go breaking my own rules. You see, I too am talking in categories, in differences in kind instead of degree. The notion of diametric opposites, the need for clear categories like Good and Bad cannot be, if we are to challenge it, innately and fundamentally Bad. To say so would undermine the argument. The problem is, every single word we read is a category, every single idea a kind of absolute. We can deconstruct and deconstruct, and then reconstruct and reconstruct, and what we'll end up with is words that stand for something, some category. Words that can never be truly specific, for true specificity would require a new word every second, every thought, every sentence. Communication, as much as miscommunication, is built on categories.
So what is there to do? Uncomfortable though it may be, I believe it remains useful to deconstruct, to analyze, to see where differences of kind actually are differences in degree, even though every difference is, in the end, actually both. To my mind, we do not need to destroy the narratives of politics, religion, morality, or, most importantly (of course), baseball. We need, instead, to dive into them, to see where they come from and why, and then to reconstruct them in some new form so that we can once again communicate. Analysis and synthesis stand together, it turns out. Like any set of supposed opposites, they actually are more alike than disparate. Is there an endpoint to all of this analyzing and synthesizing, a point at which narrative and myth turn into Truth? Maybe, but probably not. Instead, it seems to me that the very act of trying to understand, of insisting upon being a learner, an asker of questions, a thinker, a skeptic (though we might also insist on being ignorant, a provider of answers, allowed to zone out, and a believer) is at the heart of what it is to be human.
Showing posts with label Paradoxes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Paradoxes. Show all posts
Monday, April 18, 2011
Sunday, January 30, 2011
Living (I Presume)
"Life. Don't talk to me about life." - Marvin, the "Paranoid Android" from Douglas Adams's Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy
There's a place between our theoretical ideas about existence and the reality. The amazing thing is, no matter how stone-cold practical we are, no matter how tough, no matter how wise, no matter how brilliant, there's still that gap, and we still inhabit it. What do I mean, exactly? Oh, but this is one of those posts, one of those times when What I Mean is too tied up in What Does It All Mean to be clear. Nevertheless, we write on, we live on.
It strikes me that we're so obsessed with life (and the universe, and everything) that we forget living. Or is it the other way around? Are we so obsessed with living that we forget life? The latter is closer to one of T.S. Eliot's more grim lines, anyway: "Where is the life we lost in living." I guess it depends upon which word we use to signal which place in our minds. Is life the place we inhabit, or is living? Or, worse, do we inhabit neither, operating as mere automatons in some great celestial or spiritual machinery?
Between theoretical ideas about existence and the reality... What are our theoretical ideas, and what is the reality? Well, that's easy enough to say. Everything we believe is theoretical, and the reality something we can't really access, limited as we are by our senses and, above all, by the inexorable march of time. Philosophers throughout history, it seems to me, have argued about exactly how impossible it is to get to reality given our limited capacities for thought and perception - granting, of course, that our capacities far exceed those of other animals - ranging in conclusion from thought is reality to perception is reality to there is no reality at all to it doesn't matter because God will save and/or destroy us anyway to let's play backgammon instead of thinking about this anymore. Maybe the last of these is the most wise, after all, not because it is true, or right, but because to absorb oneself in a game might be the best way to inhabit our mysterious existence joyfully.
Then again, it might not be. The irony of being counter-cultural is that you need a culture to counter. Since all humans are a part of some culture or another, it stands to reason that we're never without opportunity to follow or break cultural mores. It is still the case, however, that breaking the rules is irrelevant once you become invisible: consider the trouble-making student who is only relevant because he is so numerous; the individual who sneaks out of class doesn't really effect anything - including himself - all that much.
That is what it means to be obsessed with life. We are so concerned with a troublemaker, with what happens to him, with whether he is caught, with how disruptive his actions are. We take our cultural belief systems and apply them to the situations we see around us, heaping praise and scandal on the people who stand out (often the counter-cultural ones) because we think it matters so much. But does it, really? Why are we so concerned? Why do we insist, with so much vehemence, that people do what we think is right? The origin of imperialism is in this Christian sense of Life, and with it comes a much more profound death: a death of the spirit, of ingenuity, of love. And, of course, of all of the non-Christians.
Of course, I'm essentially quoting Nietzsche here. And don't get me wrong; just because we're the children of Puritan forefathers doesn't mean that we're alone. The obsession with Life - the need to pry into other people's business, indeed, the need to see that others believe and act and do unto in the same way that you do unto - is hardly unique to Christianity, or indeed to the West. Social creatures, it turns out, find it impossible not to meddle with other social creatures.
All of which is neither here nor there, as the saying goes. The real point is that we don't inhabit either of those spaces: much as we are obsessed with life, we don't really understand - can't afford to understand, as David Hume might have it - that our beliefs are all predicated not on illusions, per se, but upon extremely limited information. We are so obsessed and so certain precisely because we are so uncertain, because no amount of research or prayer can ever get us closer to really knowing what is right. And, what's worse, we start to suspect that maybe there isn't some universal, timeless, "what's right" to begin with. We start to think that, maybe, words are just that, words, and the whole problem with trying to understand life is that, as a human, we are forced into "trying to understand life," a series of sounds (or symbols) that only have meaning thanks to an accident of evolution (brains capable of rendering meaning out of sounds) and their cultural situation.
Which isn't to say that words aren't useful, or that there's some problem with being alive. Far from it. Living is wonderful, replete with joy, friendship and love, eating, thinking, writing, playing games, and countless other good things. On the other hand, it's also full of pain, disappointment, unemployment, and frustration. Of course, even those are a part of the joy of living, because they not only can be set against the good things, but indeed can mingle with the good things to produce a more interesting tapestry. How many people love the feeling of completing a marathon, for example, not despite the pain, but because the pain makes it more sweet? Isn't it the case that the difference between a romance novel and a pornographic story is mostly a matter of how disappointed the protagonist is for the balance of the narrative?
Sometimes, however, we get so caught up in life that we forget living all together. Not that, again, we should ignore philosophies and theories and ideals. Far from it, those things can be a part of the pleasure and pain of living. But to inhabit them, to live only for life or - as Nietzsche might point out, for death - strikes me as the heart of silliness.
Ah, the irony here is too ripe. "Not that we should..." is exactly what I'm writing against, no? That's not a rhetorical question; it's a real one. You see, I'm just as trapped as everyone else, inhabiting some place between life and living, between human and animal, between good and evil. That I recognize it gives me no special benefit. And that, ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, is the real lesson.
There's a place between our theoretical ideas about existence and the reality. The amazing thing is, no matter how stone-cold practical we are, no matter how tough, no matter how wise, no matter how brilliant, there's still that gap, and we still inhabit it. What do I mean, exactly? Oh, but this is one of those posts, one of those times when What I Mean is too tied up in What Does It All Mean to be clear. Nevertheless, we write on, we live on.
It strikes me that we're so obsessed with life (and the universe, and everything) that we forget living. Or is it the other way around? Are we so obsessed with living that we forget life? The latter is closer to one of T.S. Eliot's more grim lines, anyway: "Where is the life we lost in living." I guess it depends upon which word we use to signal which place in our minds. Is life the place we inhabit, or is living? Or, worse, do we inhabit neither, operating as mere automatons in some great celestial or spiritual machinery?
Between theoretical ideas about existence and the reality... What are our theoretical ideas, and what is the reality? Well, that's easy enough to say. Everything we believe is theoretical, and the reality something we can't really access, limited as we are by our senses and, above all, by the inexorable march of time. Philosophers throughout history, it seems to me, have argued about exactly how impossible it is to get to reality given our limited capacities for thought and perception - granting, of course, that our capacities far exceed those of other animals - ranging in conclusion from thought is reality to perception is reality to there is no reality at all to it doesn't matter because God will save and/or destroy us anyway to let's play backgammon instead of thinking about this anymore. Maybe the last of these is the most wise, after all, not because it is true, or right, but because to absorb oneself in a game might be the best way to inhabit our mysterious existence joyfully.
Then again, it might not be. The irony of being counter-cultural is that you need a culture to counter. Since all humans are a part of some culture or another, it stands to reason that we're never without opportunity to follow or break cultural mores. It is still the case, however, that breaking the rules is irrelevant once you become invisible: consider the trouble-making student who is only relevant because he is so numerous; the individual who sneaks out of class doesn't really effect anything - including himself - all that much.
That is what it means to be obsessed with life. We are so concerned with a troublemaker, with what happens to him, with whether he is caught, with how disruptive his actions are. We take our cultural belief systems and apply them to the situations we see around us, heaping praise and scandal on the people who stand out (often the counter-cultural ones) because we think it matters so much. But does it, really? Why are we so concerned? Why do we insist, with so much vehemence, that people do what we think is right? The origin of imperialism is in this Christian sense of Life, and with it comes a much more profound death: a death of the spirit, of ingenuity, of love. And, of course, of all of the non-Christians.
Of course, I'm essentially quoting Nietzsche here. And don't get me wrong; just because we're the children of Puritan forefathers doesn't mean that we're alone. The obsession with Life - the need to pry into other people's business, indeed, the need to see that others believe and act and do unto in the same way that you do unto - is hardly unique to Christianity, or indeed to the West. Social creatures, it turns out, find it impossible not to meddle with other social creatures.
All of which is neither here nor there, as the saying goes. The real point is that we don't inhabit either of those spaces: much as we are obsessed with life, we don't really understand - can't afford to understand, as David Hume might have it - that our beliefs are all predicated not on illusions, per se, but upon extremely limited information. We are so obsessed and so certain precisely because we are so uncertain, because no amount of research or prayer can ever get us closer to really knowing what is right. And, what's worse, we start to suspect that maybe there isn't some universal, timeless, "what's right" to begin with. We start to think that, maybe, words are just that, words, and the whole problem with trying to understand life is that, as a human, we are forced into "trying to understand life," a series of sounds (or symbols) that only have meaning thanks to an accident of evolution (brains capable of rendering meaning out of sounds) and their cultural situation.
Which isn't to say that words aren't useful, or that there's some problem with being alive. Far from it. Living is wonderful, replete with joy, friendship and love, eating, thinking, writing, playing games, and countless other good things. On the other hand, it's also full of pain, disappointment, unemployment, and frustration. Of course, even those are a part of the joy of living, because they not only can be set against the good things, but indeed can mingle with the good things to produce a more interesting tapestry. How many people love the feeling of completing a marathon, for example, not despite the pain, but because the pain makes it more sweet? Isn't it the case that the difference between a romance novel and a pornographic story is mostly a matter of how disappointed the protagonist is for the balance of the narrative?
Sometimes, however, we get so caught up in life that we forget living all together. Not that, again, we should ignore philosophies and theories and ideals. Far from it, those things can be a part of the pleasure and pain of living. But to inhabit them, to live only for life or - as Nietzsche might point out, for death - strikes me as the heart of silliness.
Ah, the irony here is too ripe. "Not that we should..." is exactly what I'm writing against, no? That's not a rhetorical question; it's a real one. You see, I'm just as trapped as everyone else, inhabiting some place between life and living, between human and animal, between good and evil. That I recognize it gives me no special benefit. And that, ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, is the real lesson.
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Friday, December 31, 2010
The Status of Meaning and Truth in the 21st Century
Philosophers, poets, and lawyers throughout history have argued over what constitutes the truth. Or the Truth. Or the "Truth." You see, it's one of those words that changes its meaning based upon whether or not the first letter is capitalized or not, and some people are liable to accompany the sound with air quotations whenever possible. The reason? Truth is a complicated concept, an ideal that, nevertheless, seems to have some bearing on the real world. Truth is a thing most people think it is worth striving towards, and yet, it's also a thing that's incredibly difficult to actually find.
You could say the same things, pretty much, about "meaning," except that it rarely gets capitalized. The search for truth and the search for meaning are in many ways related, though in our modern parlance the latter seems to have replaced the former, as we've come into contact with more and more disparate ideas about what truth might be. As Truth (with a capital T) has lost its luster - as fewer and fewer people believe there is such a thing - more and more people are content to find meaning, knowing that truth - if it even exists - is probably not worth the effort.
In our modern age, what with Wikipedia, Twitter, email, and smart phones, it seems to me that the status of meaning and truth are changing in our society. That is not to say that truth itself is changing - if, again, there is such a thing - or that meaning is becoming harder (or easier) to find. No, what it means is that the status of those concepts and the way we use those words is changing in a way that is uncommon. Hegel has it that human history is effectively a long series of reversals in the status of meaning and truth resulting in socio-political and spiritual transformations leading humanity towards a brighter and eventually perfect future. I'm not sure I buy all of that, but part of it is fair: we, as a society (or a society of societies) are constantly redefining our purposes and goals.
That is not to say there's not a great deal of constancy in human pursuits. It would be foolish to ignore, in spite of all the radical differences between modern computer-happy man and a hunter-gatherer, the many similarities. Sure, our conflicts and desires are more sophisticated and/or fetishized than they once were, but they are still more or less the same. We still want to eat food and drink water, we still want to sleep safely, and - perhaps most important - we still are subject to strong reproductive urges that a cynic might say dictate somewhere between 90 and 100 percent of our actions. In some ways, things never change.
Ah, but what does change is understanding. Understanding is not truth, of course, nor is it necessarily meaning. Rather, understanding is a very human attempt to put construct something sensible around the chaotic mess that is the world we experience every day. Hegel would argue that, just as an individual has understanding, so too does a society as a whole. And even if Hegel wouldn't argue that, I will. From an anthropological perspective, we might just call that social understanding a "culture." That is, we establish expectations and shared experiences that are so ingrained into our world-view that generally we don't even believe that things could be any different.
Consider, as a simple (and classic) example, standard American elevator behavior. We stand, facing the door, head and hands down, quietly. Most of us engage in this socially expected behavior without even thinking about it. There are, however, examples of more consequence as well. Things like facial expressions, gestures, and intonation when we ask a question versus when we make a statement are vital to our conceptions of meaning, but yet go largely unexamined except by a select group of social scientists (who, it should be added, are mostly ridiculed). Even more important are our shared assumptions about morality and practicality, assumptions which spill over into political and religious beliefs. Indeed, perhaps the biggest reason why our political and religious disagreements tend to be so violent and irrational is because our beliefs in those areas are cultural and not rational; that is, they come from an understanding of the world that is vestigial, subtly inherited from the world we live in.
Despite those ingrained assumptions about everything from how to shake hands to how to argue about elections, it remains the case that things do change. I am not persuaded that human beings are purely rational creatures, but it does seem to me that reason and assumption dance with each other in a complex tango, leading to refined and re-defined understandings, which in turn change the possibilities for how we understand things like meaning and truth. An optimist, like Hegel, might call this process evolutionary, pushing humanity towards further refinement and perfection, while a pessimist might call it corruption. But regardless, there is change.
So where do we stand, in the year 2011, with regards to meaning and truth? Well, certainly we have destroyed "Capital T" truth. Our social reality is such that it's impossible for any reasonable person to argue that anyone in particular has access to the Truth, and while that doesn't mean there isn't one, it does mean that determining what it is is impossible. Faith still exists, of course, and a reasonable person might very well acknowledge that it is not intellectually inconsistent to have faith in a given system of truth - whether that be scientific, religious, political, or otherwise - but then again, while faith itself is not intellectually dishonest, faith without acknowledging the possibility that it is misguided probably is. Indeed, I, for one, take a very cynical view of religious strife: it seems to me like the insecurity of a bully, who will say he believes in his strength, but who secretly understands that he is not, necessarily, the strongest guy there is. So too the religious fanatic: the more fanatical, the less certain, fundamentally, he is about his faith.
"Truth," then, has become a kind of rallying call for the refusal to consider another person's perspective. "You have your facts, and I have mine," is a refrain you have likely heard. Ironically, while this means that the status of truth is undoubtedly in question, it does nothing to undermine the philosopher's ideal that Truth is worth trying to uncover. That people refuse to converse with each other and consider alternative opinions is perhaps the best indication not that there is no truth, but rather that no one is particularly working hard enough to get to it. A tutor of mine at St. John's was fond of saying that perhaps the Truth is very, very, very, very, very hard to get to, while even the most devoted lover of wisdom is only willing to work very, very hard to get there. It seems to me that Truth, if there is such a thing, is something right now we're not even willing to work hard for. If it's not on Wikipedia, it's not worth knowing. Of course, that assumes that Truth is knowledge, when it might be that Truth is, in fact, a way of thinking or a way of being.
Now that we're getting Taoist about things, I think it's time to dive into the deeper linguistic issues that are at play here. The biggest problem with Truth is not its distance or the difficulty of the search to find it, but rather its ambiguous metaphysical status. What do we mean by truth? This is why meaning is so important, and why Wittgenstein was such a crazy person.
Meaning, generally, refers to the desire we have for our lives not to be a miserable waste of time. But beyond the personal meaning we also use meaning to denote, well, what things mean. You see, the problem with talking about meaning is that it tends to be a circular conversation. Meaning is the truth of a thing, truth is the meaning of a thing, and so on. In the end, a lot of words spew out, but we don't get anywhere. Again, read Wittgenstein and you'll see what I'm talking about.
So, rather than trying to define meaning, let's talk about the status of meaning in 2011. Meaning is, in short, becoming more and more individualized, whilst simultaneously becoming more and more standardized. That is, modern technology is making a kind of paradox that even Husserl in his worst nightmares could never have imagined. Increasingly, we are encouraged to define and express our own meaning; we live in a knowledge producing, and not knowledge consuming culture (I am as guilty as this as anyone, seeing as I write a blog with very few readers, but read very few blogs myself). We are all shouting in a crowded room with our Twitter accounts and Facebook status updates. We, in short, are given a lot of leeway to define and understand what meaning means to us.
That's hardly a bad thing; indeed, more opinions and ideas is probably more likely to lead us to, if not truth, at least somewhere interesting than fewer opinions and ideas. No, the troubling part is that the variety of opinions and ideas - the individuality - we honor so much is essentially an illusion. We like, in our culture, to believe that the message and the medium are different, that the content and the form of a thing are only incidentally related. I think that's foolish. While we all have the freedom to individually express ourselves, that our media are so constricted means that the possibilities for our opinions are similarly constricted. Twitter may allow for a huge range of expressions of meaning, for example, but how huge, really? Is there not a limit to what you can say in fewer than 200 characters?
Similarly the blog, which allows for imbedding videos or songs or pictures, and thus can do things that writing alone could never do. Nevertheless, it's still limited, it's still restricting in ways that I can't express or imagine. Of course, you might argue that this has always been true, and you'd be right to do so. Humanity has never - or rarely, anyway - been able to imagine expressing meaning in ways that reach beyond the restrictions of whatever the contemporary media may be. But the danger we get into, now, that we haven't in the past, is the assumption that things are supposed to be the way they are, that modern structures are inherently good because they are modern.
Take one of my favorite examples: politics. While major parties have always been more powerful than minor ones (hence, major parties), it used to be that people found it possible to believe that neither of the two major parties were adequate expressions of their understanding of the meaning of a democratic nation. In such cases, significant - sometimes in the 20 percent range - swatches of the population voted for third parties. Now, however, we have narrowed the spectrum so far that we refuse to believe that something outside of that spectrum could possibly make sense. Voting for a third party is practically a mark of insanity, which only goes to show how dangerous constricting the form (the parties) and not the content (actual issues) can really be.
We might do this with political systems, as well. Regardless of political affiliation, it's generally considered nonsensical to believe in any kind of government but a Democratic Republic, if you live in the USA. Indeed, you have to support not just a Democratic Republic, but specifically the archaic American Constitution. It's not that we can't argue for other systems; it's that we can't even conceive of those systems.
If such is the case in something as simple as politics, imagine how much more pernicious the result of this artificial constriction of meaning is in spirituality, or music, or philosophy, or emotion. Now I'm not arguing that there should be no systems at all, or that it would be better if we had completely unchecked emotional expression (because, hey, hello murders everywhere). No, the point is that we have artificially limiting systems that people don't realize are artificial and limiting. That, again, has always been true, but never at the scale - and thus with the homogeneity - that we have now. The process of defining meaning (though not meaning itself), principally because anyone can share theirs with anyone else, is in danger of becoming homogenized. And anytime processes become homogeneous, it seems to me, you see stagnation.
Ironically - paradoxically even - we live in a time where meaning is exploding, but where the processes behind meaning are atrophied. This is a crisis much more poignant than Husserl's fear that science would destroy meaning altogether. Rather than the broad, soul-crushing forces of an Orwellian totalitarian world, we're trending towards a Brave New World in which we share a wonderful illusion of freedom, meaning, truth, and beauty. What Huxley missed, however, was that you need not restrict access to ideas or thoughts or even processes: you need only provide systems that are sufficiently limiting in form, but boundless in content. Given the proper impetus, people will restrict themselves willingly.
The status of meaning and truth in the 21st Century? Perilous, but expansive. Paradoxically healthier and sicker than ever. But that should come as no surprise. The truth of the matter is, complexity and paradox have always been present in human experience, its just that we avoid acknowledging it. Now we live in a time where refusal to acknowledge paradox is much more dangerous than it ever has been, whilst the opportunity to benefit from acknowledging paradox is larger than ever. Color me pessimistic, of course, but hopeful.
You could say the same things, pretty much, about "meaning," except that it rarely gets capitalized. The search for truth and the search for meaning are in many ways related, though in our modern parlance the latter seems to have replaced the former, as we've come into contact with more and more disparate ideas about what truth might be. As Truth (with a capital T) has lost its luster - as fewer and fewer people believe there is such a thing - more and more people are content to find meaning, knowing that truth - if it even exists - is probably not worth the effort.
In our modern age, what with Wikipedia, Twitter, email, and smart phones, it seems to me that the status of meaning and truth are changing in our society. That is not to say that truth itself is changing - if, again, there is such a thing - or that meaning is becoming harder (or easier) to find. No, what it means is that the status of those concepts and the way we use those words is changing in a way that is uncommon. Hegel has it that human history is effectively a long series of reversals in the status of meaning and truth resulting in socio-political and spiritual transformations leading humanity towards a brighter and eventually perfect future. I'm not sure I buy all of that, but part of it is fair: we, as a society (or a society of societies) are constantly redefining our purposes and goals.
That is not to say there's not a great deal of constancy in human pursuits. It would be foolish to ignore, in spite of all the radical differences between modern computer-happy man and a hunter-gatherer, the many similarities. Sure, our conflicts and desires are more sophisticated and/or fetishized than they once were, but they are still more or less the same. We still want to eat food and drink water, we still want to sleep safely, and - perhaps most important - we still are subject to strong reproductive urges that a cynic might say dictate somewhere between 90 and 100 percent of our actions. In some ways, things never change.
Ah, but what does change is understanding. Understanding is not truth, of course, nor is it necessarily meaning. Rather, understanding is a very human attempt to put construct something sensible around the chaotic mess that is the world we experience every day. Hegel would argue that, just as an individual has understanding, so too does a society as a whole. And even if Hegel wouldn't argue that, I will. From an anthropological perspective, we might just call that social understanding a "culture." That is, we establish expectations and shared experiences that are so ingrained into our world-view that generally we don't even believe that things could be any different.
Consider, as a simple (and classic) example, standard American elevator behavior. We stand, facing the door, head and hands down, quietly. Most of us engage in this socially expected behavior without even thinking about it. There are, however, examples of more consequence as well. Things like facial expressions, gestures, and intonation when we ask a question versus when we make a statement are vital to our conceptions of meaning, but yet go largely unexamined except by a select group of social scientists (who, it should be added, are mostly ridiculed). Even more important are our shared assumptions about morality and practicality, assumptions which spill over into political and religious beliefs. Indeed, perhaps the biggest reason why our political and religious disagreements tend to be so violent and irrational is because our beliefs in those areas are cultural and not rational; that is, they come from an understanding of the world that is vestigial, subtly inherited from the world we live in.
Despite those ingrained assumptions about everything from how to shake hands to how to argue about elections, it remains the case that things do change. I am not persuaded that human beings are purely rational creatures, but it does seem to me that reason and assumption dance with each other in a complex tango, leading to refined and re-defined understandings, which in turn change the possibilities for how we understand things like meaning and truth. An optimist, like Hegel, might call this process evolutionary, pushing humanity towards further refinement and perfection, while a pessimist might call it corruption. But regardless, there is change.
So where do we stand, in the year 2011, with regards to meaning and truth? Well, certainly we have destroyed "Capital T" truth. Our social reality is such that it's impossible for any reasonable person to argue that anyone in particular has access to the Truth, and while that doesn't mean there isn't one, it does mean that determining what it is is impossible. Faith still exists, of course, and a reasonable person might very well acknowledge that it is not intellectually inconsistent to have faith in a given system of truth - whether that be scientific, religious, political, or otherwise - but then again, while faith itself is not intellectually dishonest, faith without acknowledging the possibility that it is misguided probably is. Indeed, I, for one, take a very cynical view of religious strife: it seems to me like the insecurity of a bully, who will say he believes in his strength, but who secretly understands that he is not, necessarily, the strongest guy there is. So too the religious fanatic: the more fanatical, the less certain, fundamentally, he is about his faith.
"Truth," then, has become a kind of rallying call for the refusal to consider another person's perspective. "You have your facts, and I have mine," is a refrain you have likely heard. Ironically, while this means that the status of truth is undoubtedly in question, it does nothing to undermine the philosopher's ideal that Truth is worth trying to uncover. That people refuse to converse with each other and consider alternative opinions is perhaps the best indication not that there is no truth, but rather that no one is particularly working hard enough to get to it. A tutor of mine at St. John's was fond of saying that perhaps the Truth is very, very, very, very, very hard to get to, while even the most devoted lover of wisdom is only willing to work very, very hard to get there. It seems to me that Truth, if there is such a thing, is something right now we're not even willing to work hard for. If it's not on Wikipedia, it's not worth knowing. Of course, that assumes that Truth is knowledge, when it might be that Truth is, in fact, a way of thinking or a way of being.
Now that we're getting Taoist about things, I think it's time to dive into the deeper linguistic issues that are at play here. The biggest problem with Truth is not its distance or the difficulty of the search to find it, but rather its ambiguous metaphysical status. What do we mean by truth? This is why meaning is so important, and why Wittgenstein was such a crazy person.
Meaning, generally, refers to the desire we have for our lives not to be a miserable waste of time. But beyond the personal meaning we also use meaning to denote, well, what things mean. You see, the problem with talking about meaning is that it tends to be a circular conversation. Meaning is the truth of a thing, truth is the meaning of a thing, and so on. In the end, a lot of words spew out, but we don't get anywhere. Again, read Wittgenstein and you'll see what I'm talking about.
So, rather than trying to define meaning, let's talk about the status of meaning in 2011. Meaning is, in short, becoming more and more individualized, whilst simultaneously becoming more and more standardized. That is, modern technology is making a kind of paradox that even Husserl in his worst nightmares could never have imagined. Increasingly, we are encouraged to define and express our own meaning; we live in a knowledge producing, and not knowledge consuming culture (I am as guilty as this as anyone, seeing as I write a blog with very few readers, but read very few blogs myself). We are all shouting in a crowded room with our Twitter accounts and Facebook status updates. We, in short, are given a lot of leeway to define and understand what meaning means to us.
That's hardly a bad thing; indeed, more opinions and ideas is probably more likely to lead us to, if not truth, at least somewhere interesting than fewer opinions and ideas. No, the troubling part is that the variety of opinions and ideas - the individuality - we honor so much is essentially an illusion. We like, in our culture, to believe that the message and the medium are different, that the content and the form of a thing are only incidentally related. I think that's foolish. While we all have the freedom to individually express ourselves, that our media are so constricted means that the possibilities for our opinions are similarly constricted. Twitter may allow for a huge range of expressions of meaning, for example, but how huge, really? Is there not a limit to what you can say in fewer than 200 characters?
Similarly the blog, which allows for imbedding videos or songs or pictures, and thus can do things that writing alone could never do. Nevertheless, it's still limited, it's still restricting in ways that I can't express or imagine. Of course, you might argue that this has always been true, and you'd be right to do so. Humanity has never - or rarely, anyway - been able to imagine expressing meaning in ways that reach beyond the restrictions of whatever the contemporary media may be. But the danger we get into, now, that we haven't in the past, is the assumption that things are supposed to be the way they are, that modern structures are inherently good because they are modern.
Take one of my favorite examples: politics. While major parties have always been more powerful than minor ones (hence, major parties), it used to be that people found it possible to believe that neither of the two major parties were adequate expressions of their understanding of the meaning of a democratic nation. In such cases, significant - sometimes in the 20 percent range - swatches of the population voted for third parties. Now, however, we have narrowed the spectrum so far that we refuse to believe that something outside of that spectrum could possibly make sense. Voting for a third party is practically a mark of insanity, which only goes to show how dangerous constricting the form (the parties) and not the content (actual issues) can really be.
We might do this with political systems, as well. Regardless of political affiliation, it's generally considered nonsensical to believe in any kind of government but a Democratic Republic, if you live in the USA. Indeed, you have to support not just a Democratic Republic, but specifically the archaic American Constitution. It's not that we can't argue for other systems; it's that we can't even conceive of those systems.
If such is the case in something as simple as politics, imagine how much more pernicious the result of this artificial constriction of meaning is in spirituality, or music, or philosophy, or emotion. Now I'm not arguing that there should be no systems at all, or that it would be better if we had completely unchecked emotional expression (because, hey, hello murders everywhere). No, the point is that we have artificially limiting systems that people don't realize are artificial and limiting. That, again, has always been true, but never at the scale - and thus with the homogeneity - that we have now. The process of defining meaning (though not meaning itself), principally because anyone can share theirs with anyone else, is in danger of becoming homogenized. And anytime processes become homogeneous, it seems to me, you see stagnation.
Ironically - paradoxically even - we live in a time where meaning is exploding, but where the processes behind meaning are atrophied. This is a crisis much more poignant than Husserl's fear that science would destroy meaning altogether. Rather than the broad, soul-crushing forces of an Orwellian totalitarian world, we're trending towards a Brave New World in which we share a wonderful illusion of freedom, meaning, truth, and beauty. What Huxley missed, however, was that you need not restrict access to ideas or thoughts or even processes: you need only provide systems that are sufficiently limiting in form, but boundless in content. Given the proper impetus, people will restrict themselves willingly.
The status of meaning and truth in the 21st Century? Perilous, but expansive. Paradoxically healthier and sicker than ever. But that should come as no surprise. The truth of the matter is, complexity and paradox have always been present in human experience, its just that we avoid acknowledging it. Now we live in a time where refusal to acknowledge paradox is much more dangerous than it ever has been, whilst the opportunity to benefit from acknowledging paradox is larger than ever. Color me pessimistic, of course, but hopeful.
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Sunday, February 21, 2010
Nicht Diese...
Some old fashioned writing this Sunday evening (or Monday morning). A reflection.
There was a time when I kept a journal. As a high schooler, I wrote and wrote and wrote for no one but myself, trying out poetic devices, exploring thoughts on religion and love and politics, rarely, but occasionally, chronicling the day's events. In retrospect there was nothing all that peculiar about this habit of mine; after all, I was a teenager, and aspired even then to be an intellectual because of, and often in spite of, the community of peers that my private high school afforded me.
I say in spite of because there's a certain stigma attached to intellect in our competitive culture. There's nothing quite so satisfying as the smart guy who loses all the same, faced with the hard-working idiot. Mastermind has dark connotations, so too genius, in a more twisted and historical way. At the time - and maybe still today - I was caught in the paradox of intellect. Our culture honors the intellectual, but punishes and chides all the same. We value intellect, but we despise the person who recognizes their own intelligence.
Perhaps, more than anything, we despise the egotism of the self-promoter not because he is selfish - after all, there's a certain synonymity between "selfish" and "conscious" - but because he often refuses to acknowledge that, ultimately, there are always greater minds. In some sense, our fetish for specialization is a rebellion against the great minds of the great generalists throughout history, who strove to know as much as they could about as many different subjects as they could. "How dare they encroach upon my specialty!"
That's not the point, but I'm not sure what the point is. Even though I have become a writer of prose - after one time being a writer mainly of (poor) verse - I still hold a certain lesson from poetry dear: you don't have to have a "point." That's not fair to poetry, because most poems have a point in one sense or another, but there's a kind of beautiful chaos in the endeavor of poetry that prose simply cannot replicate. Even the most pointed and purposeful poetry is clothed, nonetheless, in a poetic diction, a formalism of meter and rhyme, that prevents easy unfolding. A poem may be compelling, then, but hardly in the way that a persuasive essay is.
Not all essays persuade, however. Sometimes they border on poetry. Indeed, John Dryden was one of the founders of the essay, and his Religio Laici, like the majority of his work, is in verse. Though perhaps that's poetry bordering on essay?
It is odd that we draw such a distinction, truly. Poetry comes from the Greek word meaning "to create." What difference, then, between Montaigne and Dryden, Plutarch and Sappho?
Ah, specialization is our specialty. Today we divide not just writing from poetry, but different kinds of writing and poetry from each other. The essay is a form distinct from the story, which is in turn distinct from the academic essay, the memoir, the novel, the novella, the biography, the autobiography, the treatise, the manifesto, the confession. Do we allow more experts, or fewer by such divisions? By that I mean, by splitting our brilliant writers into such camps, do we not maybe lose our brilliant writers?
That's not fair, either. A great many writers straddle such narrow definitions. Indeed, the best writers are the very cause of new terms and genres. The novel sprung into existence as a way to categorize the work of Cervantes, the essay for Montaigne. The same in music, where the Opera became a term necessary to characterize Monteverdi. The same in poetry.
Since I was a high schooler, I have learned a great deal about how little I know. I expect that, now, at a still-young 24, I have a great deal more to learn about how little I know. What is insufferable about intellectuals, it turns out, is not how much they know, but how little. Socrates was killed for it.
A turn of phrase, a turn of phrase. I have collected, in my short life of reading, a great many connections and associations - many of which are historical, and most of which are European, with occasional Hawaiian or Buddhist allusions mixed in - which allow me to express myself without expressing myself. That is another of the intellectual's tricks, and perhaps the heart of the poet's art. T.S. Eliot's Wasteland would not have gotten far without tricky, intellectual allusions. Nor would Joyce's Finnegan's Wake (the longest inside joke in history, perhaps). "Oystery Gods gaggin' Fishy Gods."
For a long time, between high school and graduate school, I stopped writing. Oh, I wrote for classes at St. John's, and I would occasionally pick up a pen ruefully in the time in between then and Stanford. Poetry, never, but occasional essays, arguments for why surfing matters - a concept that only fellow surfers will understand - or a history of the beautiful Platonic romance that closed my Freshman year of college.
Perhaps that is the object of these wanderings. The last of my poetic fervor expended itself in the poems composed for two women. The first, an illusive goddess who rekindled in me the concept of love - albeit in my hoity-toity (spelling?) way - sending me into thralls unmatched by any but my first (and less Platonic) romance. The second, my one-month-from wife, who is so much more real and wise. No goddess - for how long do such relationships last? - but instead a life. There was one poem each way, with Jericha, and that was enough. Indeed, those first poems probably say more about our relationship - even now - than anything else we could write (just as toddlers already display so many of the personality traits they will have as adults).
I suppose, for me, there is too much poetry in living for me to write poetry. I have become polemical, instead, arguing fiercely for a position on education, music, politics, or culture. Usually arguing a position untaken, or untakeable, and explaining why it should not be so neglected. A natural contrarian, I have become, who can turn "because" into "in spite of" and back again. To what end? It profits me little that I oppose so vehemently a great many things which are simply "the way it is." Why oppose, for example, specialization? It leads to such a beautiful, functional world. Why oppose citation? It leads to such easy access to knowledge. If only it were so simple.
I oppose simplicity. Or rather, I suppose simplification, which likely means I oppose myself as a writer. The vast majority of my writing - and probably all writing - is an attempt to simplify, to make expressible the inexpressible nature of being. If writing is an argument, then the most direct, simple argument wins, and the writing that best takes the complex and makes it appear simple will always be favored. I am opposed to sophistry, you might say, even though I will acknowledge that I am as good a sophist as can be found. That's perhaps a bit too self-congratulatory, for there are a great many sophists in this world better than I.
When I allow myself to write honestly - or, at least, without regard for how complicated a narrative I weave - I find that I use the word "perhaps" with astounding frequency. Perhaps. It's a versatile word, but what it does more than anything is act as a crutch. There is no better word for avoiding conclusions than perhaps. Perhaps there is no better word for avoiding conclusions than perhaps. See the difference? One is certain, the other... Perhaps.
Judicious use of "perhaps," (and "seems," and "this suggests," and "I think," and "possibly") might be a mark of intellectual rigor, laziness, or both. Judicious use of perhaps might, also, be my least poetic trait as a writer. Good writers avoid pointless, empty words like "perhaps." It means nothing. Or it means everything.
Now I'm stealing from Demetri Martin* (I run the gamut; Socrates to Important Things), which perhaps indicates that our winding road is nearing its end. What is that end? Hard to say. What the journey? Equally hard.
* To wit: 'Sort of' is such a harmless thing to say. Sort of. It's just a filler. Sort of - it doesn't really mean anything. But after certain things, sort of means everything. Like after 'I love you' or 'You're going to live.'
Nicht Diese Tone, I titled this blog, and though I addressed it in my opening post (gulp, five months and about 60 posts ago), perhaps a return to that theme is in order. The title is German, meaning "not these tones." In retrospect, why a negative? Of all the phrases from Beethoven's Ninth, why this one? I suppose it's the contrarian in me, the intellectual who doubts the value of intellectuals; the liberal who despises the term "liberal;" the musician, astrologer, and student who wants to be everything and, sometimes, just wants to be nothing and play computer for six hours. How to describe these qualities ("and this, and so much more"), how to 'fix myself in a formulated phrase'?
There was a time when poetry was written, and though it is still written, what magic is left after the placing of such lines as "All truths wait in all things," and "It is impossible to say just what I mean." Ginsberg was reduced to a string of "Holy, Holy, Holy ..." Perhaps profound in its own right. Perhaps too self-indulgent.
But we live in self-indulgent times, which I also oppose, and also embody. Maybe paradox is the real lesson. Maybe it always has been. Or rather, maybe paradox and order, chaos and structure, sway ever across some abyss of human meaning. Death, there's the real question, the ultimate contrarian, and the hardest thing for a contrarian to oppose. And yet we have a society built around death (or built around a religion built around death, to paraphrase Nietzsche). Those poems that haunt me and inspire me sit on that precipice. Prufrock, a poem afraid of death, Song of Myself, a poem of celebrating life. Of all the paradoxes of being, that may be the most poignant, and, ironically, the most taboo in our modern age.
In truth, I have little to contribute to such looming questions as "what is the meaning of life?" Ultimately, I resist the question as unsophisticated, at least as it is commonly asked. No, ask it like Eliot, for then it is complicated enough to warrant my austere notice. Or something like that... The true story is, I first recognized the terrible power of the fear of death watching, of all things, Stargate SG-1. How's that for a paradox? What can I say, after all, that is profound?
Nicht Diese, indeed.
There was a time when I kept a journal. As a high schooler, I wrote and wrote and wrote for no one but myself, trying out poetic devices, exploring thoughts on religion and love and politics, rarely, but occasionally, chronicling the day's events. In retrospect there was nothing all that peculiar about this habit of mine; after all, I was a teenager, and aspired even then to be an intellectual because of, and often in spite of, the community of peers that my private high school afforded me.
I say in spite of because there's a certain stigma attached to intellect in our competitive culture. There's nothing quite so satisfying as the smart guy who loses all the same, faced with the hard-working idiot. Mastermind has dark connotations, so too genius, in a more twisted and historical way. At the time - and maybe still today - I was caught in the paradox of intellect. Our culture honors the intellectual, but punishes and chides all the same. We value intellect, but we despise the person who recognizes their own intelligence.
Perhaps, more than anything, we despise the egotism of the self-promoter not because he is selfish - after all, there's a certain synonymity between "selfish" and "conscious" - but because he often refuses to acknowledge that, ultimately, there are always greater minds. In some sense, our fetish for specialization is a rebellion against the great minds of the great generalists throughout history, who strove to know as much as they could about as many different subjects as they could. "How dare they encroach upon my specialty!"
That's not the point, but I'm not sure what the point is. Even though I have become a writer of prose - after one time being a writer mainly of (poor) verse - I still hold a certain lesson from poetry dear: you don't have to have a "point." That's not fair to poetry, because most poems have a point in one sense or another, but there's a kind of beautiful chaos in the endeavor of poetry that prose simply cannot replicate. Even the most pointed and purposeful poetry is clothed, nonetheless, in a poetic diction, a formalism of meter and rhyme, that prevents easy unfolding. A poem may be compelling, then, but hardly in the way that a persuasive essay is.
Not all essays persuade, however. Sometimes they border on poetry. Indeed, John Dryden was one of the founders of the essay, and his Religio Laici, like the majority of his work, is in verse. Though perhaps that's poetry bordering on essay?
It is odd that we draw such a distinction, truly. Poetry comes from the Greek word meaning "to create." What difference, then, between Montaigne and Dryden, Plutarch and Sappho?
Ah, specialization is our specialty. Today we divide not just writing from poetry, but different kinds of writing and poetry from each other. The essay is a form distinct from the story, which is in turn distinct from the academic essay, the memoir, the novel, the novella, the biography, the autobiography, the treatise, the manifesto, the confession. Do we allow more experts, or fewer by such divisions? By that I mean, by splitting our brilliant writers into such camps, do we not maybe lose our brilliant writers?
That's not fair, either. A great many writers straddle such narrow definitions. Indeed, the best writers are the very cause of new terms and genres. The novel sprung into existence as a way to categorize the work of Cervantes, the essay for Montaigne. The same in music, where the Opera became a term necessary to characterize Monteverdi. The same in poetry.
Since I was a high schooler, I have learned a great deal about how little I know. I expect that, now, at a still-young 24, I have a great deal more to learn about how little I know. What is insufferable about intellectuals, it turns out, is not how much they know, but how little. Socrates was killed for it.
A turn of phrase, a turn of phrase. I have collected, in my short life of reading, a great many connections and associations - many of which are historical, and most of which are European, with occasional Hawaiian or Buddhist allusions mixed in - which allow me to express myself without expressing myself. That is another of the intellectual's tricks, and perhaps the heart of the poet's art. T.S. Eliot's Wasteland would not have gotten far without tricky, intellectual allusions. Nor would Joyce's Finnegan's Wake (the longest inside joke in history, perhaps). "Oystery Gods gaggin' Fishy Gods."
For a long time, between high school and graduate school, I stopped writing. Oh, I wrote for classes at St. John's, and I would occasionally pick up a pen ruefully in the time in between then and Stanford. Poetry, never, but occasional essays, arguments for why surfing matters - a concept that only fellow surfers will understand - or a history of the beautiful Platonic romance that closed my Freshman year of college.
Perhaps that is the object of these wanderings. The last of my poetic fervor expended itself in the poems composed for two women. The first, an illusive goddess who rekindled in me the concept of love - albeit in my hoity-toity (spelling?) way - sending me into thralls unmatched by any but my first (and less Platonic) romance. The second, my one-month-from wife, who is so much more real and wise. No goddess - for how long do such relationships last? - but instead a life. There was one poem each way, with Jericha, and that was enough. Indeed, those first poems probably say more about our relationship - even now - than anything else we could write (just as toddlers already display so many of the personality traits they will have as adults).
I suppose, for me, there is too much poetry in living for me to write poetry. I have become polemical, instead, arguing fiercely for a position on education, music, politics, or culture. Usually arguing a position untaken, or untakeable, and explaining why it should not be so neglected. A natural contrarian, I have become, who can turn "because" into "in spite of" and back again. To what end? It profits me little that I oppose so vehemently a great many things which are simply "the way it is." Why oppose, for example, specialization? It leads to such a beautiful, functional world. Why oppose citation? It leads to such easy access to knowledge. If only it were so simple.
I oppose simplicity. Or rather, I suppose simplification, which likely means I oppose myself as a writer. The vast majority of my writing - and probably all writing - is an attempt to simplify, to make expressible the inexpressible nature of being. If writing is an argument, then the most direct, simple argument wins, and the writing that best takes the complex and makes it appear simple will always be favored. I am opposed to sophistry, you might say, even though I will acknowledge that I am as good a sophist as can be found. That's perhaps a bit too self-congratulatory, for there are a great many sophists in this world better than I.
When I allow myself to write honestly - or, at least, without regard for how complicated a narrative I weave - I find that I use the word "perhaps" with astounding frequency. Perhaps. It's a versatile word, but what it does more than anything is act as a crutch. There is no better word for avoiding conclusions than perhaps. Perhaps there is no better word for avoiding conclusions than perhaps. See the difference? One is certain, the other... Perhaps.
Judicious use of "perhaps," (and "seems," and "this suggests," and "I think," and "possibly") might be a mark of intellectual rigor, laziness, or both. Judicious use of perhaps might, also, be my least poetic trait as a writer. Good writers avoid pointless, empty words like "perhaps." It means nothing. Or it means everything.
Now I'm stealing from Demetri Martin* (I run the gamut; Socrates to Important Things), which perhaps indicates that our winding road is nearing its end. What is that end? Hard to say. What the journey? Equally hard.
* To wit: 'Sort of' is such a harmless thing to say. Sort of. It's just a filler. Sort of - it doesn't really mean anything. But after certain things, sort of means everything. Like after 'I love you' or 'You're going to live.'
Nicht Diese Tone, I titled this blog, and though I addressed it in my opening post (gulp, five months and about 60 posts ago), perhaps a return to that theme is in order. The title is German, meaning "not these tones." In retrospect, why a negative? Of all the phrases from Beethoven's Ninth, why this one? I suppose it's the contrarian in me, the intellectual who doubts the value of intellectuals; the liberal who despises the term "liberal;" the musician, astrologer, and student who wants to be everything and, sometimes, just wants to be nothing and play computer for six hours. How to describe these qualities ("and this, and so much more"), how to 'fix myself in a formulated phrase'?
There was a time when poetry was written, and though it is still written, what magic is left after the placing of such lines as "All truths wait in all things," and "It is impossible to say just what I mean." Ginsberg was reduced to a string of "Holy, Holy, Holy ..." Perhaps profound in its own right. Perhaps too self-indulgent.
But we live in self-indulgent times, which I also oppose, and also embody. Maybe paradox is the real lesson. Maybe it always has been. Or rather, maybe paradox and order, chaos and structure, sway ever across some abyss of human meaning. Death, there's the real question, the ultimate contrarian, and the hardest thing for a contrarian to oppose. And yet we have a society built around death (or built around a religion built around death, to paraphrase Nietzsche). Those poems that haunt me and inspire me sit on that precipice. Prufrock, a poem afraid of death, Song of Myself, a poem of celebrating life. Of all the paradoxes of being, that may be the most poignant, and, ironically, the most taboo in our modern age.
In truth, I have little to contribute to such looming questions as "what is the meaning of life?" Ultimately, I resist the question as unsophisticated, at least as it is commonly asked. No, ask it like Eliot, for then it is complicated enough to warrant my austere notice. Or something like that... The true story is, I first recognized the terrible power of the fear of death watching, of all things, Stargate SG-1. How's that for a paradox? What can I say, after all, that is profound?
Nicht Diese, indeed.
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