Showing posts with label sports. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sports. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

College Education, College Sports

The United States is the only country in the world that weds higher education and amateur athletics inextricably together.  The University of Michigan, to most of us, is not just an elite post-secondary research institution, but a football team, the home of Denard Robinson, famous rival of Ohio State.  If I type "michi" into Google, auto-complete suggests "Michigan Football," "Michigan State Football," and "Michigan Football Schedule."  Somehow, this doesn't strike us as odd.

A narrow view of the phenomenon suggests that football is primarily a marketing mechanism.  Schools like Michigan attract both perspective applicants and alumni donors by virtue of having a competitive and successful football program.  Defeating rivals, landing in major bowls, and fielding exciting players are all a boon to the University as a whole because, like any good marketing, successful football leads to more visibility and more positive emotional associations with the school on the part of donors and prospectives.  All of which is true.  Football, in particular, is a wonderful way for American colleges and universities to promote their brand.

Branding alone, however, does not account for the phenomenon as a whole.  Any given university may want a great football program - or a great athletics program broadly - for branding and marketing reasons, but does the system on the whole really benefit higher education all that much?  While the University of Michigan may be better off with a great football team than with a bad one, is the entire state university system better off by virtue of their football programs?  I don't have an answer for that question, but it's worth posing.

Now, it's well-nigh impossible to imagine American higher education without competitive athletics.  College football won't be going away, even if we could somehow prove that college football is bad for universities and colleges.  That said, a better understanding of where sports fits into the ecology of higher education in the United States might help us think about hot-button issues in college athletics, including the debate over whether or not athletes should be paid.

The argument over paying college athletes - and especially big-time football and basketball players - has been hashed and rehashed in popular media.  In short, the argument for paying players is, essentially, that they are making tons of money for their schools (and for media companies) with almost no compensation.  The argument, at its heart, is capitalistic: college athletes do not get to participate in the free market for their services and skills, and that is unfair because there is a substantial market that others are participating in (coaches, ADs, ESPN, etc) built upon those very skills.  The argument against paying college athletes is, broadly, that college sports are supposed to be an amateur endeavor, and that colleges and universities are primarily geared towards educational missions.  Enrolling in a university - even on a football scholarship - means that you are a student first and foremost.  Paying athletes for playing college sports, then, would further degrade the educational mission of the university.  At its heart, what this argument really says is, "colleges and universities are not a capitalistic free market; they're a socialized public service."

Now, I'm not going to weigh in on either of those arguments, because the debate seems to me to be taking place in the wrong arena.  There's no question that college athletes ought - in a capitalist system - to be compensated at market value for the benefits they bring to their institutions.  There's also no question that colleges and universities do not by-and-large operate in anything resembling a true capitalist system.  The reality is, both sides are right because neither is willing to admit the systematic and philosophical assumptions of the other.

The debate, however, is academic, because the route we're traveling down is unequivocally the capitalistic one.  So what is that likely to look like?

In a purely capitalistic, free market higher education system institutions would have to pay their own players according to their market value.  Instead of offering a scholarship to a desired recruit, a football program would have to offer a scholarship plus a salary or contract.  In essence, college athletics would become professional, and colleges and universities would create professional athletics teams that operate alongside the University.  Realistically, a great many of the current D1 college athletics programs would not be able to afford the competition this would create, and so we'd be left with a small number of elite athletics programs at wealthy schools that can afford to fund not only athletic scholarships, but also player salaries.  As a result, the little money that travels from athletic departments to other parts of the university - in the form of both media contracts and donations - would almost certainly disappear (hence athletics would truly be "alongside" and not really "part" of the university).

From the athlete's perspective, there's nothing particularly wrong with this.  He is likely to be better off in this system than in the current one.  Unless, of course, he is a she.  Or plays a sport other than basketball and football.  Or isn't quite good enough to warrant anything beyond a scholarship.  In our current system, very few athletic departments are profitable, thanks in large part to the many sports that college athletes play but no one watches.  In a system with increased payouts to athletes in high-profile sports, it seems unlikely that those unprofitable sports programs would continue.  And in a free market, that's as it should be.  If women's volleyball can't turn a profit - or at least break even - it shouldn't exist.

Now, all of my analysis here is built upon the assumption that colleges, and not media outlets or other companies, will be paying student-athlete salaries.  I think that's a safe assumption, but someone might argue that an elimination of the amateur status of college athletes would have little effect on institutions themselves, as very very few college athletes would warrant exorbitant salaries that schools could not afford.  Rather, they might say, companies like ESPN or Nike or whoever would be the real payees in the form of sponsorships and commercial spots and so on.  That's a fair assumption, but free agency in other American - and international - sports leagues suggests to me that institutions overpaying for marginal players is a more likely outcome.

As for the educational missions of institutions of higher learning in the truly free market system, it seems to me that they will be little changed.  The biggest change is happening already anyway: less and less public money would go towards colleges and universities, which in turn would search for new revenue streams, including, most importantly, increased tuition and decreased financial aid.  Professionalization of college athletics might infuse new revenues into the higher education system, but those revenues would almost certainly be dedicated primarily (or exclusively) towards funding the professional athletics programs.  More and more universities would have to adopt the D3 sports model, where every player is a walk-on and no athletic scholarships are awarded because of how expensive it would be to field a competitive (and therefore economically viable) athletics program.

There is a good argument for this kind of system: it would allow the great majority of institutions the chance to essentially do away with one of their biggest expenses (both in terms of money and human capital).  In a free market, if the University of Hawaii cannot really afford a D1 football program (let alone D1 basketball, baseball, volleyball, etc), it simply won't have one.  In the end, that might actually be better for the university.

It's not hard to see, of course, that this is the direction we're going.  The super-conference phenomenon is a consolidation of the most economically robust football programs into a bloq that effectively excludes the University of Hawaiis of the world from the most meaningful and, therefore, lucrative events like big-time bowl games and high-profile rivalries.  It is probably only a matter of time before athlete compensation becomes a reality, and college sports is professionalized, as the institutions that can afford to pay their football players will already have divided themselves from those that cannot.  The end of the whole process is, ultimately, that college sports will be an extremely visible part of higher education, with very little actual bearing on the educational missions of those schools.

While the professionalization of college athletics may not have too direct a bearing on the educational missions of colleges and universities, the underlying trend towards increased capitalization will.  That's it's own post, but some of the results are already apparent: increased tuition, more and more course content moving online (though frequently with only dubious credentials, if any at all, available to graduates), an increasingly large access divide among socio-economic classes (that is, rich white kids who can afford tuition go to elite states schools or liberal arts colleges, while poor minority students go to vocational schools or online for-profits), and an ever-growing student debt bubble.  Which all raises a significant question that the sports debate largely ignores, but shouldn't: what is the purpose of college education, both for the student and for society at large?

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Ferrero, Sequoia, and Finding a Home

Juan Carlos Ferrero used to be the best tennis player in the world.  Back in 2003, in the middle of that five-year vacuum between Sampras and Federer, Ferrero joined Andy Roddick, Lleyton Hewitt, and even, briefly, Andre Agassi in taking his turn at the top of the tennis-ranking mountain.  Now Ferrero is 31, still young by the standards of society, but positively ancient in the world of tennis.

Ferrero fell short of the quarterfinals at this years U.S. Open after losing to the colorfully named Janko Tipsarevic.  And had he managed to win that match, an almost certain defeat at the hands of current world number one Novak Djokovic waited at the other end.  Regardless, the Tipsarevic match I have little to say about, except that it was a hard-fought four setter.  The match before it was the interesting one.

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On our way to San Diego, my wife and I suddenly found ourselves in bumper-to-bumper traffic.  Now that's no surprise in Southern California, but in this case the traffic was particularly bad.  The highway, it turns out, was on fire.  Or, rather, a fire raged on both sides of I-15 in Victorville, just north of the northern reaches of the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  After two and a half hours of trying to find a way around the flames, we turned North instead, setting out on an unexpected path.

We ended up in Lake Isabella, on the doorstep of Sequoia National Forest.  Big trees, we thought.  We want to see big trees.  We rolled into a shabby old motel near the lake at almost 10:00 PM, after starting our day in Flagstaff, Arizona, and called it a minor, if unexpected, victory.

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Gael Monfils might be the most entertaining player on the ATP World Tour.  He dives to make his shots, he lopes around the court, he pouts, he yells, he engages in a subtle rope-a-dope that announcers - and, in theory, his opponents - mistake for nonchalance.  Above all, he plays with joy and the curse of grace, and so the crowd loves him and is yet frustrated by his failure to be better.

The "curse of grace" is a term Joe Posnanski uses to describe Carlos Beltran.  Some athletes are so gifted, so refined, so graceful at what they do that they appear not to be trying.  If only, we think, he would try a little harder, he'd be truly great.  Gael Mofils tries hard.  You don't become as good a tennis player as he is (#7 in the World entering the U.S. Open) without practicing hours and hours and hours a day, without pushing yourself, without learning how to give more than you think you have.  And yet he looks like he's not trying, because he's just that graceful, and because - despite the criticism it brings - he wants you to think that he's not trying.

Juan Carlos Ferrero, whose own grace is largely a memory by now, beat Gael Monfils in five sets last week.

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After a long drive through the Kern River valley, up into the mountains, we finally arrived at the big trees.  The first one lurked behind a turn on the road, eliciting cries of surprise and awe as we passed.  Even if you've watched Planet Earth, even if you've seen one of the countless pictures of the Giant Sequoias, nothing can prepare you for actually seeing one.

We happily paid to park next to the somewhat touristy Trail of 100 Giants trailhead.  Rarely - though moreso in National Parks than anywhere else - the touristy vibe of a place is irrelevant to its own internal grace.  The Giant Sequoias along the trail we walked were in no way lessened by the paved path that weaved between them, nor by the screaming of children unaccustomed to a screen-less walk through a natural monument.

One child in particular screamed and screamed and screamed.  He didn't want to go towards the leaning tree, or away from something he liked, or along a path near so many bees.  The exact nature of his protest was hard to make out, but it was, I'm certain, directional.  It seemed to me, above all, that he didn't want to confront the Sequoias.  No child is able to comprehend those trees.  Indeed, probably no adult can really understand what it means for a tree to be 1,500 years old.  Constantine is ancient history; the birth of a Sequoia, even more so.

Infinity is not nearly as overwhelming a concept as finite but large.  The Sequoias are giants - too big to see the top of, over a dozen feet in diameter at the base, sometimes scarred with burn marks as large as an entire cedar tree - but it is their relationship to time, more than space, that truly impresses.  What can a child do but cry when confronted with a 75-year-old baby of a Sequoia that's older than Granpa, and yet at only the beginning of its young life?

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Monfils played as Monfils plays.  Ferrero played as he is forced to at his age.  After a gritty first set tiebreaker, Monfils power and agility won out in tight second and third sets.  He looked to be in command of the match, but he plays an expensive brand of tennis.  Every dive, every collapse, the effort of chasing down so many of Ferrero's well-placed shots caught up with Monfils.  He still held serve in most every game down the stretch of the final two sets, but a break here and a break there, and Ferrero closed out the match 6-4, 6-4 in the final two sets.

Tennis - especially at a Major Tournament like the Open - is a grueling sport.  As important as power, speed, and agility are, stamina and the ability to pace oneself are just as important.  Ferrero rarely overexerted himself in his match with Monfils, playing just hard enough to push the Frenchman, just pesky enough to stay in the first three sets and steal one of them.  Then, by the time the fourth set rolled around the match was already well over three hours old, and Monfils's grace and nonchalance turned into fatigue, and Ferrero showed the instinct that allows you to be the best in the world, if only for a short time.

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The tree we spent the most time with was dead.  It had fallen well over 100 years ago, and yet it had barely decayed.  For the Sequoias even death moves in slow motion.  Lying on the ground, it's easier to appreciate the sheer size of one of these Giants.  Walking from base to tip is roughly equivalent to traversing three tennis courts.  Climbing onto the curved peak affords one a view of a dangerous fall.  Bringing the virtually imperceptible giants to human scale only further reinforces how unfathomably huge they are standing up.

On the exposed faces of the fallen Sequoia people had scrawled initials, expressions of undying love, crude jokes, and brief political rants.  It's tempting to be upset about the human need to spoil natural beauty, but in this case anger is as perfectly irrelevant as the illegible carvings.  These trees do not exist on any human scale, and our petty efforts to make them ours - by writing on them, or by protecting them from writing - misses their point.  Indeed, they do not have, in any human sense, a point.  They are merely trees.  What power we exert over or in service of them says more about us than it does about them.

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 I wonder about players like Juan Carlos Ferrero.  What motivates him to keep playing when he knows that he stands little chance against the Roger Federers and Rafael Nadals and Novak Djokovics of the modern game?  As time passes the gap between himself and the top players grows, and as new top players find their way to the peak of their own games, Ferrero will continue to be the same Ferrero who reached his peak in 2003, and has been fighting to maintain a semblance of that greatness ever since.  Sure, another big paycheck, another endorsement deal or two can't hurt, but defeat does hurt for a champion.

"The love of the game" is a hackneyed and inadequate response to the question.  Of course Ferrero loves the game, and of course he believes in himself.  Somewhere, though, in the back of his mind, he has to know that the victories left to him are the ones that are not won during prime time, with the lights shining on him and the TV cameras rolling.  He might beat Gael Monfils, who is number seven in the world, but that is still a minor, unexpected victory.  Maybe, though, even for a former world champion, that's all that matters sometimes.

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Now we're searching for a home in the South Bay.  The trees are behind us.  Their monolithic presence has given way to human concerns: a place to sleep, food to eat, a toilet to shit in.  As we search we've been forced to reconnect with commerce, with the artificial rules and regulations of the social contract, with the cultural codes that run even deeper than that, with the games that you have to play.  The U.S. Open is still on TV.

And what is a home, really?  It's a place to stay, but - as the saying goes - you can carry it on your back.  It's a transitory phenomenon, a place defined by its residents, a moment.  And yet the question "Where do you live" usually elicits a one word response: Honolulu, Denver, San Francisco.  These capital-letter stand-ins for the particular moments we spend in our homes speak to eternity, a time that spans our own lives.  In the end, a home is both the moment and the eternity, the place and the Place.  Perhaps we don't always look for these things, but we find them anyway.  Or, anyway, they find us.

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What does Juan Carlos Ferrero have to do with the Sequoias?  Nothing, really.  Ferrero operates on a human scale, searching for a victory this week, and another one next week.  His career as a tennis player will be over soon, even though it only just started, even by the standards of a normal human "career."  The Sequoias, on the other hand, lie mostly outside of human perception.  Comprehending what it means for anything to exist for 1,500 years is essentially impossible for a creature that lives less than 100 years.  Eternity is not the precise word, but it might as well be.

As I search for a home, I'm really searching for a place where I can filter my perceptions, understand my interactions, and ground my existence.  Wrapped up in a home is an understanding of home in its moments and in its eternities.  Ferrero and the Sequoias are experiences I filter through myself, and as I look for a home, I look for a way of understanding not the meaning of tennis or really big trees, but rather something about myself.  I know where I am going, what I am going to do, and perhaps even a little bit about who I am.  Still, there's something else that a home represents in time, in space, and in understanding.

That something is wrapped up in eternity and in moments, in trees and tennis courts, and, above all, in the way we move through it all.

Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Win Probability and Tennis

As a huge baseball statistics nerd, I love Fangraphs.com.  Well, I don't really read many of their articles, nor do I engage in their often contentious comment threads.  Rather, I love the thing that made it famous: win probability graphs.  If you haven't seen one, they look like this.

Hey look, the Royals lost a game they should have won!

The premise is simple.  Given any game situation, you can calculate - based on the number of expected runs scored for both the remainder of the inning and the remainder of the game - how likely each team is to win.  Certain events, like home runs, tend to increase your odds significantly, while others, like strikeouts with the bases loaded and two outs, tend to hurt them.  Of course, context becomes extremely important, and the graph will fluctuate more in closer games like the Royals versus Tigers game above.

Now the cool part is not even the graph itself, but the "Leverage Index" beneath it.  Basically, the amount of change that is possible/likely in any given situation is mapped beneath the graph.  This leads to a clear, quantitative mapping of high and low leverage situations.  This in turn, leads to cool calculations of things like "clutch," which fangraphs calculates by comparing a player's performance in low leverage situations to his performance in high leverage ones (instead of the standard, and unsatisfying "close and late").

All of this is old hat to baseball fans, and my point isn't to recap what you already know or could find on fangraphs.  Rather, I want to put out a call to coders, web developers, and tennis fans to do this for tennis.  I've seen a man named Jeff Sackmann produce a "Tennis Win Expectancy Graph" for a particular match, but as far as I know, there is no widely available tool to let tennis fans calculate win probability on their own, much less a live scoreboard like on fangraphs.

If anything, win probability for tennis should be simpler than for baseball.  Rather than having to calculate run expectancies, your set of variables are much, much smaller.  If you use the tour wide statistic, as Sackmann does, that the server will win 64% of points, you can, theoretically, easily produce a win probability algorithm.  Turning that into a graph is obviously not too difficult, given Sackmann's own work.

So let's make it happen! Tennis needs would benefit from win probability graphs as much as baseball.  Questions that win probability (and leverage index) could help answer include:
1) Do great players "raise their level" on key points, or are they just always better?
2) How much of a difference in point-by-point leverage is there between a three and five set match?
3) What is the "most important" point in a given match?
There are countless others, so I won't list them all.  But even these should whet the appetite of the statistically-minded tennis fan.

Now you're probably thinking: "great, so do it yourself."  If only I could.  I have spent most of the day watching the U.S. Open and playing around with Excel.  But while the mathematics are not beyond me (though they are harrier than you might think), the coding is.  Perhaps someone else wants to take the baton?  If so, I'd be a happy contributor, cheerleader, partner in the process, to whatever degree I can.

Hey, fangraphs isn't just graphs, it's also writers.  If someone starts "tennisgraphs," I'll be happy to write for it.

Sunday, May 22, 2011

Defining a Season: 2002-2006

Part three of a series of Rockies-centric posts.
Introduction here.
Part one here.
Part two here.
Part four here. 

2002 Colorado Rockies: 73-89, 4th place, 25.0 GB

It was during 2002 that a new era of Rockies baseball began with the hiring of Clint Hurdle as manager.  Following a slow start, the Rockies let go of Buddy Bell and replaced him with the former hitting coach, a move that I would not go so far as to say defined the Rockies for the next five seasons, but definitely set a certain tone.  Clint Hurdle's hiring was an indication that the team was changing, trying to get younger and trying to build from within.  While witnessed the disastrous collapses of Neagle and Hampton, Rockies fans in 2002 also watched the first wave of young up-and-comers from the Rockies growing minor league system in Jason Jennings, Juan Uribe, and Juan Pierre.

Defining Player: CF - Juan Pierre

Pierre was an exciting young player in 2002, but despite his impressive speed, he wasn't a particularly good player.  He didn't get on base enough, was not quite a good enough fielder, and was completely without power.  His slash line (.287/.332/.343) left much to be desired, especially playing at Coors Field, and despite his youth it was hard to see him as a centerpiece on a future contender.  Nevertheless, on a team now stuck with aging, mediocre, and largely overpaid players around the diamond, Pierre was a symbol of a different approach, a glimpse of a future of home grown talent.  Beyond being a symbol for a future approach, however, Pierre was also an important part of the post-2002 trade that sent Mike Hampton to the Florida Marlins, meaning he also played a key, if ironic, role in the transition to the home-grown approach.

2003 Colorado Rockies: 74-88, 4th place, 26.5 GB

There was little compelling about baseball in Colorado during the dark-ages of the mid-2000s.  Todd Helton and Larry Walker would quietly put up All-Star numbers year after year, but no one else was particularly compelling.  Sure, the offense hit plenty of homers (the 2003 team had 7 players with 10 or more HR), and the bullpen was usually solid, and the rotation usually at least a little better than it looked, but there were simply too few players good enough to push the team to .500, let alone to contention.

Defining Player: 3B - Chris Stynes

Unless you're a die-hard Rockies fan, you probably have never heard of Stynes.  Even if you're a die-hard, you probably had forgotten about him.  But he was the Rockies starting third baseman for the whole of the 2003 season, punching up a miserable slash line of .255/.335/.413.  Of all the players from the dark ages of Rockies baseball, Stynes is the most mediocre, the most forgettable.  If someone were to ask: why couldn't this team manage to win more than 74 games, you could do worse than answering "Chris Stynes," not because of who he was, but because of what he represented for an organization treading water.

2004 Colorado Rockies: 68-94, 4th place, 25.0 GB

After the 2002 and 2003 seasons, things got worse before they got better.  The 94 losses the Rockies suffered in 2004 was the worst in franchise history since the inaugural season in 1993.  Nevertheless, at the bottom of the proverbial barrel (so far, anyway), there was a scrap of hope.  The new organizational focus on building from within didn't quite start to payoff in 2004, but it did bear its first fruit.

Defining Player: LF - Matt Holliday

Perhaps its not fair to say that Matt Holliday was the defining player of one of the worst seasons in Rockies history, but I still think he fits precisely because it was him - and his generation of minor league teammates - that the organization had changed its philosophy.  As the Rockies floundered throughout the 2004 season, Holliday put up a solid .290/.349/.488 line.  Excellent?  Hardly, but at only 24 Holliday showed promise that none of the other young players the Rockies had developed ever had (since Helton, that is).  Here was a power hitter, an anchor for the lineup to replace the now departed Larry Walker.  Here was, in short, the future.

2005 Colorado Rockies: 67-95, 5th place, 15.0 GB

Things began to come together for the Rockies in 2005.  That's strange to say, given that they finished in last place in the worst division in baseball (as the mere 15 games back indicates, the Padres won the division with an 82-80 record).  However, this was the rookie season for Clint Barmes, Garrett Atkins, and Brad Hawpe.  While none of those players would ever approach Holliday in talent or production, they would all become important pieces to the 2007 World Series team.  And, more importantly, each of them was drafted and developed by the Rockies.  There were growing pains, to be sure, as the 67-95 record indicates, but the future was looking bright.

Defining Player: SP - Jeff Francis

The future was bright not because of the offensive players listed above, important though they would be in 2007.  No, the most important rookie in the '05 season was Francis, the first of so many first-round pitchers the Rockies had drafted to actually make it to the big leagues.  Francis, like the Rockies, was far from impressive in 2005.  His 5.68 ERA was well-deserved, given a SO/BB rate under 2, a fairly high 1.3 HR/9 rate, and a pitch-to-contact approach that is always dangerous in Colorado.  Nevertheless, there were glimpses from Francis (and his young rotation-mate, back from a near-fatal blood clot suffered in 2004, Aaron Cook) that he could tame the Coors Field beast, along with the help of the now operating humdior.

2006 Colorado Rockies: 76-86, tied for 4th place, 12.0 GB

In a still-weak division, the Rockies in 2006 were a team on the brink.  That's easy to say after-the-fact, but the signs were there even at the time.  The core of Helton, Atkins, Holliday, and Hawpe provided enough offense that little else was needed to fill out a contender's lineup.  Meanwhile the top of the rotation, featuring Cook, Francis, and Jason Jennings, was well above-average.  The bullpen remained solid as well, though mostly a collection of cast-offs from other teams (a trend for the Rockies front office).  Though the team finished 10 games under .500, they were really just another year of development from their young players, plus the arrival of a certain shortstop and certain pitcher, away from ending nearly a decade of futility.

Defining Player: 1B - Todd Helton

Though the team as a whole was young, unproven, but about to explode, the 2006 team's shortcomings were defined best by the Helton.  This season looked like the beginning of the end for Todd, the first season in which he would fail to hit 20 home runs, and easily his worst season by batting average, OBP, and slugging percentage in his career.  However, his place here is not merely because he underperformed his talent as the team struggled to a 76-86 season, but because the beginning of his decline underscored the urgency of the next few seasons, and because Helton would, like the rest of the team, have an excellent season in 2007.  On a team of young up-and-comers, a team transitioning from age to youth, from hitting to pitching, Helton was not merely harkening back to old days, but also a reminder that he too was once a young star, an up-and-comer, and that chances to win are sometimes few and far between.  Not for his shortcomings, but because he was for so long the only shining light on a miserable team, does Helton deserve to be remembered as an iconic player not just for the 2006 Rockies, but throughout the early 2000s.

Friday, May 20, 2011

Defining a Season: 1998-2001

Part two of a series of Rockies-centric posts.
Introduction here.
Part one here.
Part three here. 
Part four here. 

1998 Colorado Rockies: 77-85, 4th place, 21.0 GB

If the '96 and '97 seasons were the beginning of the decline of the Blake Street Bombers, the '98 season was the end.  Ellis Burks was traded for a just-as-old, but not-nearly-as-good Darryl Hamilton, Vinny Castilla turned 31, and Dante Bichette's power contined to fade.  Even the outstanding rookie campaign of Todd Helton couldn't lift what proved to be a fatally flawed roster in what ended up being manager Don Baylor's final season.  The '98 season was disappointing, perhaps, because expectations were still high after three straight seasons in which the Rockies were at least good, if not great.  But it was impossible to ignore that a team already in decline had taken a fateful step towards sub-.500 baseball.

Defining Player: SP - John Thomson

I know what you're thinking.  Who is John Thomson?  In 1998, Thomson was the Rockies best pitcher, the only member of the rotation with an ERA under 5.00 (his was 4.81).  While Coors Field didn't do any favors to Darryl Kile and Pedro Astacio, they didn't do any favors to themselves, either.  Despite the still potent - if decreasingly so - lineup, the Rockies rotation in 1998 was inadequate, and Colorado found itself on the losing end of a few too many blowouts.  That the bullpen was, once again, excellent was some consolation, but hardly enough for a team who's best pitcher was, in the end, John Thomson.

1999 Colorado Rockies: 72-90, 5th place, 28.0 GB

As if it wasn't bad enough that the Rockies finished in last place for the first time in 1999, the second-year Arizona Diamondbacks broke their record for fastest expansion team to make the postseason, winning 100 games and the division in only their second season.  Meanwhile the Rockies were a mess.  The once vaunted bullpen began to crack, the remaining Bombers - except for Helton and Larry Walker (who spent a significant part of the season on the disabled list) - lost their clout, and the rotation was, if not terrible, at best mediocre.  Coors Field, meanwhile, continued to inflate offensive numbers to an absurd degree, which excused the horrid offense and deflected blame to a not-as-bad-as-it-looks pitching staff.

Defining Player: SS - Neifi Perez

In many ways, Neifi is the defining player for a whole era of Rockies baseball.  He manned shortstop almost every game between 1998 and his trade in 2001, and at no time was he even a remotely passable offensive player.  In 1999 he had one of his worst seasons, hitting a good-on-the-surface .280, but with only a .307 OBP and .403 slugging percentage.  Neifi's 12 home runs in 1999 would end up being a career high, but even so, his OPS+ was 62.  For that reason, he is the defining player of the 1999 season because he looked like an acceptable player, but wasn't.  He was a sinkhole, an out waiting to happen, an incapable hitter even at Coors Field (where his OBP was a measly .326) whose road numbers were simply awful (.251/.287/.356).  Neifi's empty batting average, his mirage power, and the perception that he was actually good typify the Rockies organization during a season in which the team lost 90 games despite looking like they weren't that bad.

2000 Colorado Rockies: 82-80, 4th place, 15.0 GB

Despite a strong NL West and an offseason during which the team made few significant changes, the Rockies bounced back from their 1999 season with a surprising above-.500 campaign in 2000, giving hope for a post-Bombers future.  This was a fateful season, however, because the rotation was better than mediocre, and the offense worse, and yet the offseason that followed would see the acquisition of Denny Neagle and Mike Hampton.  In reality, the offense needed far more help than the rotation did, but Coors Field made it seem the other way.

Defining Player: SP - Pedro Astacio

Pedro Astacio had a 5.27 ERA in 2000, and his was the second lowest in the Rockies rotation.  His 12-9 record was nice enough, but he surrendered 32 home runs, and gave up almost 10 hits per 9 innings.  What gets lost in those sub-par numbers, however, is his 193 strikeouts against only 77 walks, and the adjusted ERA+ of 110, meaning Pedro was actually 10% better than league average.  Throughout his career with the Rockies, Astacio was a victim of misperception: he always seemed a worse pitcher than he was.  Sabermetrics hadn't yet taken hold in the baseball world at large, and so the Rockies saw what was actually a strength as a weakness.

2001 Colorado Rockies:  73-89, 5th place, 19.0 GB

In many ways, this was the worst season in Rockies history.  After a lot of preseason hype - including some bold proclamations that the Rockies were the team to beat in the NL - and a hot start, the Rockies fell apart.  The chief reason was an offense that sported only two better-than-league-average hitters, Larry Walker and Todd Helton.  Moreover, the expensive contracts for Hampton and Neagle did not pay dividens, as John Thomson lead the pitching staff in ERA and ERA+, and Pedro Astacio was, in many ways, better than both free agents.

Defining Player: SP - Mike Hampton

 Could there be a more perfect symbol for a team with high expectations that didn't work out?  Could there be a better symbol for a team that looked like it could hit, that pitched better than it seemed to do, but was not quite good enough at either?  Hampton was all of those things, with a price tag of over $100 million.  What doomed Hampton, more than anything, is that he couldn't strike anyone out (5.4 SO/9).  At Coors Field, in a part where batted balls turn into hits more than almost anywhere else in baseball, this was a cardinal sin.  That said, Hampton wasn't horrible.  His ERA+ in 2001 was 99, placing him firmly as league average.  But for a supposed ace, the highest paid pitcher in history (at the time), that wasn't good enough.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Defining a Season: 1993-1997

Part one of a series of Rockies-centric posts.  See the introduction here, part two here, part three here, and part four here.

1993 Colorado Rockies: 67-95, 6th place, 37 Games Back (GB)

The Rockies inaugural season was impressive despite the abysmal .414 winning percentage.  Colorado led the league in attendance with almost 4.5 million fans, thanks to Mile High Stadium, and boasted their first batting champion in Andres Galarraga.  In all, the 1993 was a season of unbridled optimism, an unspectacular but promising first step in a career.

Defining Player: SP - David Neid

Neid was the Rockies first pick in the inaugural draft, a former Braves prospect and a promising young talent.  Though injuries would stop him from ever becoming the pitcher he had the potential to be, in 1993 Neid showed glimpses of his quality, including a complete game 5-3 win against the Mets in April.  Indeed, Neid - the Rockies' opening day starter and presumptive ace - started the season 3-1 with a 3.10 ERA.  Beyond all that, though, Neid was a symbol of all things new in Colorado: a rookie pitcher on a rookie team, an early promise that the Rockies would have an anchor in their rotation for years to come, and an early fan favorite.  That things didn't work out that way only further reinforces his place as the defining player of the '93 season, for reasons that will become clear.

1994 Colorado Rockies: 53-64, 3rd place, 6.5 GB at time of strike

The strike season was disappointing for fans across baseball, but it was especially hard on the Rockies* because of their rabid new fanbase.  By the time the season was called off, the Rockies attendance had already surpassed 3 million, and while their 53-64 record was far from great, it was a vast improvement over the '93 campaign.  The mere possibility of losing the 1995 season was frustrating to fans who had approved a new ballpark to be opened that year.  After the expectation and excitement of 1993, 1994 should have been another step forward - and it was, to a point - but it turned out a kind of limbo.

* It was hardest on the Montreal Expos, who comfortably lead their division by 6 games - at 74-40 - when the rest of the season was called.  After the strike fan interest waned and, before long, the team was moved to Washington, D.C.

Defining Player: 1B - Andres Galarraga

The Big Cat gets the nod here because he was good in 1994, but not nearly as good as he was in '93.  He followed up his league-leading .370 batting average with a .319 effort, and while he crushed a crowd-pleasing 31 homers in only 103 games, he also struck out 93 times, and the lack of adequate support in the lineup left him with only 85 RBI to go with his power.  What's more, the strike put him in limbo as much as anyone.  The promise of stardom - after a solid, but far-from-special career before the Rockies - had started to shine on Andres, but the strike robbed him of a full year of productive baseball at a time when he could least afford it.  Like Neid in '93, he was destined never to be at the heart of the Rockies again after 1994, as Larry Walker and then Todd Helton would steal the spotlight.

1995 Colorado Rockies: 77-67, 2nd place, 1.0 GB, Wild Card

Never before had a team made the MLB playoffs as early as the third year of their existence, but thanks to the shortened season, the addition of the wild card, and some shrewd moves by the front office and career years by the players, the Rockies managed to play their way into the postseason in 1995.  They were promptly crushed by their nemesis, the Atlanta Braves (who had, incidentally, beaten them in every matchup they had in 1993).  Even so, the Rockies were historically good for a 3rd year team, and their new ballpark and hitter's heaven named Coors Field was packed every night.

Defining Player: RP - Curtis Leskanic

The '95 Rockies performed better than expected thanks largely to their bullpen, and that bullpen was great thanks largely to Leskanic.  He worked in over half of the teams games, leading the league with 76.  He struck out 107 in 98 innings.  Despite Coors Field, he boasted a 3.40 ERA, and surrendered only 7 home runs all season.  Above all, though, Leskanic represents the '95 Rockies because, while he had always had decent stuff, this was by far the best season of his career, and it was totally unexpected.  He was still relatively young, like the team he pitched for, and he came out of nowhere to outperform all expectations quietly, but consistently.

1996 Colorado Rockies: 83-79, 3rd place, 8.0 GB

The '96 Rockies were the victims of an excellent division.  Both the San Diego Padres and the Los Angeles Dodgers won at least 90 games, leaving a solid Rockies team in the dust.  Despite a solid record and another season of leading the league in attendance, 1994 was a disappointment coming off of the playoff berth in 1995.  Despite being in only their 4th season, this Rockies team is the second oldest (by average age of the players) in Rockies history, behind only the 2004 edition.  Though young in a grander sense, this was a team with a rapidly closing window.

Defining Player: SP - Kevin Ritz

Not only was his own window rapidly closing, Kevin Ritz was the perfect mix of good and bad in 1996, capturing the essence of the team's season.  His 17-11 record was good, but his 5.28 ERA (and 99 ERA+,  meaning that even adjusted for Coors Field he was merely league average) is none-too-pretty.  He was a horse, starting 35 games and working 213 innings, but he walked exactly as many hitters as he struck out (105).  At 31 years old, this was a strange season for Ritz: good, but not as good as his 1995.  Nevertheless, he was rewarded with a raise from $740,000 to $2.5 million going into 1997, expectations high after his moderately successful '95 and '96 seasons, but set up for disappointment.

1997 Colorado Rockies: 83-79, 3rd place, 7.0 GB

Expectations were high coming into 1997, and in many ways this was the Rockies most disappointing season.  They were contenders for most of the season, and were once again done in by a solid division and a lack of depth in both the rotation and the lineup.  The Blake Street Bombers were in their heyday, but four of the team's regular starters had an OPS+ under 100 (league average).  Similarly, the Rockies used six different starting pitchers regularly in '97, but only two managed to be above league average.  Even another excellent campaign from the bullpen wasn't quite enough.

Defining Player:  LF - Dante Bichette

No player was not-quite-enough enough than Dante Bichette.  As Larry Walker bashed his way to a deserved MVP award in 1997, putting up incredible numbers (Coors aided or not), Bichette was the poster-child for the overrated Blake Street Bomber.  He hit 26 homers, with a .308 average and .343 OBP, but those numbers are less impressive thanks to Coors, and his defense was bad enough that he actually was worth exactly 0.0 Wins Above Replacement for the season.  Dante was coming off of a number of good - or at least better - seasons, but like the Rockies he was getting too old too fast, and it was too hard to admit that this iconic figure for a young organization wasn't good enough to play for a contender.

Friday, April 22, 2011

10 Playoff Teams? No Thank You

Bud Selig has made it abundantly clear that, starting in 2012, Major League Baseball will expand its playoff structure to include ten teams.  At present, the MLB playoffs feature eight teams, four from each league.  Each division champion, along with a single wild card - the owner of the best non-division champion record in the league - advance to the playoffs.  In the first round, the best division champ plays the wild card while the other two division champs square off in best of five game series.  The second round features the winners of those series in a best of seven, and then the World Series, also best of seven, pits the champions of each league against each other.

I describe the system in detail because it's a good one.  It works.  The playoffs are compelling and entertaining, and, given how short they are relative to the season, completely non-indicative of who has the best team.  Adding another team to each league's playoff pool will do nothing to change that and, indeed, will only exacerbate the problem.

Of course, this move is all about money.  Bud is certain that more playoff games equals more cash for himself, his owners, and the league in general.  So the whole thing is a no-brainer, even though most baseball fans seem to despise the idea.  What few apologists there are, however, like to point out that deserving teams are often left out of the playoffs as they are currently constructed.  For example, in the National League in 2008, the Los Angeles Dodgers made the playoffs with a 84-78 record, while the Houston Astros (86-75), the St. Louis Cardinals (86-76), and the New York Mets (89-73) were all better.  Of course, Bud's solution to this problem isn't actually a solution, because Los Angeles won their division that season, and would have made the playoffs regardless.

Here's how the new system will work.  Before the best of five first round, the now two wild cards will play each other in a best of three (read, complete toss-up) series.  This punishes the wild card team for not winning its division, of course, but also rewards a team that previously wouldn't have made the playoffs with a non-trivial chance of winning the World Series.  In 2008, for example, the Dodgers still make the playoffs, but wild card Milwaukee would have to play New York in a first round three-gamer while all of the other teams sat and watched.

Rather than levying philosophical objections against this new system, I want to show what it would actually do.  So let's look at the MLB since the wild card first entered the league in 1995, and see how things would be different in this new system.  I'm not going to list division winners, just what that first round matchup would have been.  Listed first is the actual wild card from the season in question, with the new entry second.  I've also bolded the particularly egregious situations where the second wild card is more than five games behind the actual wild card, and thus, in my opinion, is a farce.

1995
American League - New York Yankees (79-65) vs. California Angels (78-67) 
National League - Colorado Rockies (77-67) vs. Houston Astros (76-68)

1996
AL - Baltimore Orioles (88-74) vs. Seattle Marines (85-76)
NL - Los Angeles Dodgers (90-72) vs. Montreal Expos (88-74)

1997
AL - New York Yankees (96-66) vs. Anaheim Angels (84-78)
NL - Florida Marlins (92-70) vs. New York Mets or Los Angeles Dodgers (88-74)

1998
AL - Boston Red Sox (92-70) vs. Toronto Blue Jays (88-74)
NL - Chicago Cubs (89-73) vs. San Francisco Giants (89-73)

1999
AL -  Boston Red Sox (94-68) vs. Oakland Athletics (87-75)
NL -  New York Mets (97-66) vs. Cincinnati Reds (96-67)

2000
AL - Seattle Mariners (91-71) vs. Cleveland Indians (90-72)
NL - New York Mets (94-68) vs. Los Angeles Dodgers (86-76)

2001
AL - Oakland Athletics (102-60) vs. Minnesota Twins (85-77) 
NL - St. Louis Cardinals (93-69) vs. San Francisco Giants (90-72)

2002
AL - Anaheim Angels (99-63) vs. Seattle Mariners or Boston Red Sox (93-69)
NL - San Francisco Giants (95-66) vs. Los Angeles Dodgers (92-70)

2003
AL - Boston Red Sox (95-67) vs. Seattle Mariners (93-69)
NL - Florida Marlins (91-71) vs. Houston Astros (87-75)

2004
AL - Boston Red Sox (98-64) vs. Oakland Athletics (91-71)
NL - Houston Astros (92-70) vs. San Francisco Giants (91-71)

2005
AL - Boston Red Sox (95-67) vs. Cleveland Indians (93-69)
NL - Houston Astros (89-73) vs. Philadelphia Phillies (88-74)

2006
AL - Detroit Tigers (95-67) vs. Chicago White Sox (90-72)
NL - Los Angeles Dodgers (88-74) vs. Philadelphia Phillies (85-77)

2007
AL - New York Yankees (94-68) vs. Detroit Tigers or Seattle Mariners (88-74)
NL - Colorado Rockies (89-73) vs. San Diego Padres (89-73)

2008
AL - Boston Red Sox (95-67) vs. New York Yankees (89-73)
NL - Milwaukee Brewers (90-72) vs. New York Mets (89-73)

2009
AL - Boston Red Sox (95-67) vs. Texas Rangers (87-75)
NL - Colorado Rockies (92-70) vs. San Francisco Giants (88-74)

2010
AL - New York Yankees (95-67) vs. Boston Red Sox (89-73)
NL - Atlanta Braves (91-71) vs. San Diego Padres (90-72)

For those of you keeping score, that's ten times since 1995 that one of the wild cards would have a record over five games better than their first round opponent.  There are also a number of division-rival matchups here, which I'm sure MLB would love, but which complete defeats the point of finishing better than your division rivals during the season.  For example, just last year the Yankees finished 6 games better than the Red Sox, and yet Mr. Selig wants them to play each other in a three game playoff in the first round?

Crunching the numbers, here's what we're looking at (leaving out the strike-shortened 1995):

Average W-L of Wild Card: 93.2 - 68.8
Average W-L of Wilder Card:  88.9 - 71.1

So the second wild card would have been, on average, four games worse than the first wild card.  Whereas wild card have averaged 93 wins, the second wild card would have averaged under 90.

Two things to wrap this up, since I'm more interested in showing the data here than grinding my axe overmuch (too late!).  First, baseball isn't basketball or football.  The better team doesn't win every time.  Letting the 2001 Oakland A's (102 wins) play the Twins (85 wins) in a three game series would be a travesty, because there's every possibility that the Twins win that series.  Upsets may be fun and all, but we like to feel like they're at least somewhat deserved, right?

Second, why would baseball ruin all the goodwill it has accumulated in the last few years?  While the NFL just went and shot itself in the foot with a lockout, and the NBA is about to do the same, MLB has ironically become the most dependable American sports league (behind, maybe, the MLS; but despite its growth MLS remains a second-tier league).  Baseball is in a good place right now, why mess with it by adding an inferior (very inferior) second wild card to each league in the playoffs?

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Shakespeare Lives in Topeka

Thanks to Pitchers and Poets I just read this somewhat infuriating article by Bill James (general smart guy and honorary father of modern Sabermetrics, for those of you who don't know him). Eric Nusbaum does a nice critique of the salient logical fallacies of the article, but I have my own entirely more pretentious and cultural axe to grind.  Upon doing so in the comments, I realized that I had written a blog post, so I transfered the thing over and made a couple edits and additions.  Enjoy.

Are we great at producing athletes?  Of course we are.  But to say that we don't develop great writers or philosophers or artists or whatever in our society is total and utter hogwash.  We produce a whole lot of great thinkers, and, thanks to 1) increased access to great ideas of both the past and present, 2) more sophisticated and far-reaching networks, and 3) improved social justice, I would guess that we're producing just as many if not more great thinkers per capita as Shakespeare's London.

Now, it is certainly true that we don't value great thinkers commercially as much as we do athletes, thanks to the nature of consumption of their respective products, but one need only spend a few hours in a university library somewhere to see that there's a whole hell of a lot of darn good writing going on in the world (and, hey, save the gas and spend some time surfing the interwebs or even *gasp* watching television, since a lot of darn good writing is happening both of those mediums, as well; people are writing and reading more now than at any time in history).

Is contemporary writing "great" writing?  Well, what does "great" even mean?  Doesn't a big part of Shakespeare's greatness come from the hundreds of years of cultural and academic narrative we've built around his work?  I'm not arguing against it's inherent quality, but as silly as that would be, it's equally silly to claim that no one writing today is as good as Shakespeare.  Indeed, I would argue that there might be dozens or even hundreds (or even, dare I suggest, thousands or tens of thousands) of writers today with both the natural talent and the refined sensibilities to match Shakespeare.  The reality is, we don't have the lens of history through which to look at the present, and we don't have the time to compare all of those potential Topekan Shakespeares to old Will, so it's impossible to really know.

What's more, our whole cultural paradigm has shifted.  No longer is there a single Canon of great works that everyone reads, certainly not among works produced in the last half-century.  Instead, there are sub-cultures and sub-canons.  Whereas the work of producing great literature, art, and philosophy was once concentrated in the hands of a select few masters, now that same work is distributed across vast networks of vaguely interconnected domains.  The result: umpteen great writers with talent and determination and good educations and so on, most of whom do not fail to be considered great because of the quality of their work, but because they simply never find much of an audience.  Remember, most of us had to be forced to read Shakespeare in school, anyway (and many students just read the cliff notes), and that's freaking Shakespeare.  How much more likely are we to ignore a modern writer of equal quality, but whose work is not forced down our throats?

In short, it's silly to ignore all of the vast cultural differences between Shakespearean London and modern Topeka (or anywhere else).  I'm as much a fan of the notion of something eternal in human experience as anyone, and I also happen to think that reading Shakespeare (and Bacon, and Kant, and Plato, and Hegel, and so on) is a good idea.  But you can't just call writers from before 1900 "Great" and write off modernity.  You can't claim that some seminal works of the past might be closer to capital-T Truth without acknowledging that the way in which times have changed has had a profound impact on the process of thinking, writing, the organization of society, and our notions of greatness.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

NBA League Size and Competitiveness, Part the Last: Calculating Competition

Today we embark on a journey through the perilous land of inventing your own statistics.  As a wrap-up for this series on NBA competitiveness and league size, I wanted to create a kind of competitiveness index based upon the regular season results in any given season.  That has proved to be a more difficult task then I originally anticipated, for reasons which will become clear.

First off, though, why would I want to do something like this?  Well, as I discussed in Part One, I'm reading The Book of Basketball, by Bill Simmons, and was struck by how definitive his assessment of which NBA seasons were competitive and which weren't is.  In particular, some of the early seasons in the NBA sparked comments like, "Everyone had a good team back then."  I wanted to try to figure out if he was right because, as sabermetrics has taught us, often people who are passionate and well-informed fans of a sport still don't really understand what's going on.

For example, in baseball it was long believed that carrying a .300 batting average alone was sufficient to make you a good hitter.  "A .300 hitter" was - still is - an honorable appellate, as well as a since qua non of baseball success.  What about a player like Juan Pierre, though, whose career .298 average puts him close enough to be called a .300 hitter? Is he really any good?  Old-time baseball wisdom would say yes.  He's fast, he hits for a high average, and he's the kind of guy that people assume is a good fielder, whether he is or not.  But even offensively, you can dive deeper into his batting lines and see that he's a deeply, deeply flawed player.

You see, Juan Pierre does not really draw walks.  Nor does he hit for power.  So despite a career .300 average, he sports a .347 OBP - not bad, but not good enough for someone who aspires to be an integral part of a team's success.  Moreover, his .366 career slugging percentage means that he's a singles hitter.  Those many hits he does generate aren't in the gaps or over the fence (as evidenced by his 14 career homers in almost 1600 games).  Now, the traditional baseball viewpoint would be that all of Pierre's singles are made up for by his stolen bases...  Which is fair, except he has lead the league in getting caught stealing 6 times, and stolen bases only 3 times.

 Which is all to say that being a .300 hitter alone used to look great, and still looks great.  But looks can be deceiving.  No one should confuse Juan Pierre with a great hitter.  Similarly, sometimes a league might look competitive without actually being competitive.  And so I embarked on this little blog-project to prove Simmons right and/or wrong.

In Part Two I found and discussed that, while defining competition - let alone assessing it - might be very difficult, we can at least see that, as the league gets larger, so too does the standard deviation of winning percentage.  From one perspective that means that the league is getting less competitive - in the sense that teams are less jumbled together - but from another it means the league is getting more competitive - in the sense that there are more elite teams in any given season.  And that's exactly what my work for today's post shows.

What I did was develop a formula for "competitiveness," using the number of above-.500 teams, the mean of their winning percentages, and the standard deviation of their winning percentages.  My reasoning was this: if a higher percentage of teams are above .500 in a given season, the league is more competitive.  Similarly, the higher the average winning percentage of those teams, the more competitive the league is.  Lastly, the more condensed those winning percentages are (the lower the standard deviation), the more competitive the league is.  The advantage of this approach, of course, is that we can completely ignore any team that finished .500 or worse.  Those teams, I reasoned, don't really count (even if many of them do make the playoffs, thanks to the NBA's "everybody makes it" attitude towards the postseason).  The disadvantage, as the statistically acute among you will see, is that the components I have selected here are all closely related to standard deviation of winning percentage league wide.

What does that mean?  Well, let me show you.

X - Number of teams, Y - "Competitiveness"
My formula for competitiveness is messy, but worth sharing.  Brackets indicate the separate components, which I tried to normalize so that 1 was more or less "average":

[(0.5 + Percentage of teams above .500)] x [10 x (mean above .500 - .5)] x [(stdev above .500 - mean above .500) / (stdev above .500 + mean above .500)] x 50

I multiplied the whole thing by 50 just to pull it up into a more readable and intuitive range.  Basically, 50 is normal (as you can see, the trendline above is close to, though not quite at, 50), while anything above 50 is a particularly competitive season, and anything below 40 is uncompetitive.

Now this graph alone doesn't show you anything problematic.  Like our graph from Part Two, it has a weak, but present trend going upwards, and...  Wait.  It looks very similar to that graph.

So I graphed "competitiveness" by year, and made the following line graph:

"Competitiveness" (Y) by season (X)

 I then did the same with Standard Deviation of winning percentage:

STDEV of Wpct (Y) by season (X)
Now you may notice that these two graphs look almost exactly the same.  With a sinking feeling - starting to realize the folly of my ways - I graphed the two against each other:


Competitiveness (Y) against STDEV of Wpct (X)
 The result is unambiguous.  My "Competitiveness" ranking basically tells me that when the standard deviation of the winning percentages league wide are high, the competitiveness is also high.  Which, of course, is the opposite of what I was suggesting in Part Three.  Yeah.

The result is hardly surprising, as I said, because of the components in my formula.  While the percentage of better-than-.500 teams may not have much bearing on standard deviation of winning percentage, obviously when the mean of the winning percentage of teams above .500 is higher, so too will be the standard deviation of winning percentage of all teams.  Meanwhile, the final component of my formula - accounting for standard deviation of above-.500 winning percentages - will be inversely related to standard deviation of winning percentages league wide, but not enough, obviously, to disrupt the high correlation between "competitiveness" and SD of winning percentage league wide.

But really, this only goes to show that "competitiveness" is a highly ambiguous term.  Where one fan might think the most competitive season is the one where all of the teams are bunched together, another might prefer the one with five great teams and five terrible ones.  It's really a matter of perspective.

Where Simmons makes his determination, then, is probably the best place: skill of players in the league.  While you do have to be careful here - because all evaluation of player skill is heavily influenced by the relative skills of his contemporaries, and things like changing league sizes mess with our understanding of what is good and what is great - probably the best way to assess the competitiveness of the league at any point is to assess the overall skill of the players in the league at a given time.  That's a much more challenging project, but I can imagine going through players and seeing where great careers overlap, and figuring out when talent has been at its apex and nadir.  Of course, Simmons does that kind of thing for a living - though without relying too much on numerical analysis and going more with his perception, a more-than-fair, if perilous, approach.  John Hollinger also does that for his living, relying absolutely on numbers.  So between the two of them, you can probably get a good sense of what's going on.

Finally, if you want to see the nuts and bolts of my work - messy as it is - I've posted my workbook to GoogleDocs.  Do with it what you will.

Friday, February 11, 2011

NBA League Size and Competitiveness, Part Three: Outliers

Before I dive into more statistical analysis in an effort to answer the question as to whether a larger NBA leads to stiffer competition or not, I want to take a brief (ha!) interlude to consider a few outlier seasons.  In Part Two we saw this graph:

Again, X is number of teams, Y is standard deviation of winning percentage
 There are, as you can see, a handful of data points here that are particularly far from the trendline, in both directions.  From the ultra-competitive mid-1950s to the mess that was the last two seasons of the ABA, I've picked the eight most notable points on either side of the trendline to discuss in this post.  I'll be grouping these by era.

The Early Days - 1950s

The 50s were an interesting time for the NBA.  The league was small, there was no three point line, and the shot clock didn't come to the league until the 1954-55 season.  Moreover, the league - and the country - had not quite worked out a number of racial issues, and so the league was dominated by white players.  What's more, because basketball was still new, there were not throngs of kids who grew up playing the game (football and especially baseball were the sports of the time in America), meaning it was harder to find talented athletes.

The 1952-53 season was one of the "least competitive" - at least by standard deviation of winning percentage - in the history of the NBA.  With a SD of .198, the league was both top and bottom heavy.  Interestingly, no team won more than 70% of their games, but the SD is so high because only one team won between 40 and 60% (the Fort Wayne Pistons).  At the high end, the New York Knicks went 47-23, the Syracuse Nationals went 47-24, the Boston Celtics went 46-25, the Minneapolis Lakers (which makes much more sense than the Los Angeles Lakers) went 48-22, and the Rochester Royals went 44-26.  On the other hand, the Baltimore Bullets and Philadelphia Warriors went 16-54 and 12-57 respectively.

Despite the disparity in winning percentages in 1952, point differentials were much smaller.  The league's high-scorers from Rochester averaged 86.3, while the Indianapolis Olympians averaged 74.6 points per game.  Both are astoundingly low by modern standards, but more remarkable is the gap - or lack thereof - between the two.  Consider the 2009-2010 NBA, in which the Phoenix Suns averaged 110.2 ppg, while the New Jersey Nets put up only 92.4.  As for point differential, the Milwaukee Hawks went 27-44, but were outscored, on average, only 77.4 to 75.9.  One gets the sense that they fell behind, and then had the clock milked against them.

The shot clock changed everything in the NBA, and it's no accident that three of the most competitive season in NBA history were 1954-55, 1955-56, and 1956-57.  Those were the first three seasons of the shot clock, and the clumping of W-L records alone shows that teams were really struggling to understand how to play in a transforming league.  SDs for those years were .087, .061, and .054(!).

That the league was changing was obvious.  In 1954-55 the Boston Celtics averaged over 100 points per game (on both defense and offense), both NBA firsts.  No team stood out in those three seasons, however, despite the complete transformation of the game.  In part this was due to a small league, in part a lack of standout talent, in part a shorter season, and in part, of course, a drastic rule change.  It took until the 1957-58 season for some team to start to pull away from the pack, some team to start to "get it" in this new era of no-running-out-the-clock basketball.  That team?  The Boston Celtics.  Not surprisingly, they had been the best offensive team in the league before the shot clock, and they continued to be for years afterwards.  What catapulted them to dominance, however, was defense.  They kept scoring, and added Bill Russell as a rookie in 1956-57.  Even that year they won their first NBA championship and finished 44-28, but the league as a whole was still bunched together (the Western Division featured no less than three 34-38 teams).

As Russell's career took off, the competitiveness of the league disappeared.  The Celtics became such a dominant force that by the 1959-60 season, the pendulum had swung so far in the other direction that a 59-16 Celtics team, combined with a 19-56 Cincinnati squad, led to a SD of .188, the second highest in league history.  Of course, 1959 is one of those seasons where we have to wonder about what "competitiveness" really means.  The uneven talent distribution did mean that Cincinnati, Minneapolis, New York, and Detroit got hammered far more often than not, but the other four teams were all about .600.  Boston's 59-16 was countered by Philadelphia's 49-26, and Syracuse's 45-30.  The St. Louis Hawks finished 46-29 in the West, as well.

By now scoring was way, way up as well.  The Celtics, in 1959, averaged 124.5 on offense, and 116.2 on defense.  Average!  No wonder Wilt Chamberlain was able to put up 37.6 a game, or Bob Cousy averaged almost 10 assists.  Anyway, this is one of those seasons, ironically, where "everyone had a good team" in the opinion of Bill Simmons, and he has a point.  Everyone may not have had a good team, but four teams definitely did.  Consider the following key players (win shares in parentheses):

Boston -  Bill Russell (13.8), Bob Cousy (7.9), Bill Sharman (7.8), Tom Heinsohn (7.7)
Philadelphia - Wilt Chamberlain (17.0), Tom Gola (9.9), Paul Arizin (9.2)
Syracuse - Dolph Shayes (9.5), George Yardley (9.0), Larry Costello (8.0)
St. Louis - Cliff Hagan (11.8), Bob Pettit (11.5), Clyde Lovellette (9.0)

Who cares if Minneapolis's Elgin Baylor (11.5, with no support from anyone else on the team) was the only other really good player in the league, the best teams were all loaded with talent.  Which, of course, only begs the question: which is better, a league with 4 great and 4 terrible teams, or a league with 8 teams who all have a change to beat each other?

The End of the ABA, and the Merger - 1970s

The early and mid 1970s were an interesting time for the NBA.  The ABA - which included three-pointers and lots more slam dunks - emerged as a competitor, but also hemorrhaged money and was responsible for seasons that were, by any measure, extremely uncompetitive.  It was, in short, more of a show league, but it put pressure on the NBA just the same.  1972 was a pivotal year, in particular, because the NBA switched TV partners, moving to CBS from ABC after the season.  It was also, by standard deviation, the single least competitive season in NBA history.

On the plus side, a 68-14 Boston Celtics team romped through its division, while 60-22 Milwaukee and 60-22 Los Angeles led the way in the Western Conference.  The New York Knicks ended up upsetting Boston in the Conference Finals and went on to crush Los Angeles in five games in the Finals.  But, like 1959, 1972 was marked by a handful of great teams and a handful of truly awful ones.

On the minus side was Philadelphia, finishing an unheard of 9-73, a full 59 games behind Boston.  Buffalo - from Philadelphia and Boston's division, went 21-61, meaning the Atlantic had two of the best and two of the worst teams in the NBA.  Portland, cellar-dwellers in the West, was also an uninspiring 21-61, and their division mates, the Sonics, went 26-56.  In all, it was a year of extremes, in a league waiting for a merger (which would bring, among others, Julius Erving to the NBA), with its TV deal caught in limbo, and yet with all of the attention that a third New York - Los Angeles finals brought to the league.  Throw in Wilt Chamberlain and Kareem Abdul-Jabaar, and the NBA was making inroads in mainstream America.

Meanwhile, the ABA was falling apart.  The 1974-75 and 1975-76 seasons were, well, horrible.  With the merger looming, and teams facing bankruptcy, competitive balance suffered.  Posting SDs of .191 and .190, the last two seasons of the ABA were more or less a joke.  Already down to 10 teams in 1974, after a 27-57 season Memphis closed up shop, and San Diego and Utah both played fewer than 20 games in 1975, finishing 3-8 and 4-12 respectively before calling it quits.  The final season of the ABA, then, featured only 7 teams including a Virginia squad that finished 15-69 for the second year in a row.  Ultimately, in a top heavy league, it made sense for the New York Nets, the Denver Nuggets, the San Antonio Spurs, and the Indiana Pacers to make the jump to the NBA as the ABA finally closed its doors.

The 1975-76 NBA season had been, in stark contrast to the ABA, highly competitive (SD of .105).  At 54-28, Boston led the Eastern Conference, while a 59-23 Golden State team led the West.  Other than those two teams, however, no one finished higher than .600, while only one team - 24-58 Chicago - finished below .300.  Parity was the word, and so the addition of four good teams from the ABA, along with a redistribution of talent from the folding ABA teams, meant that 1976-77 would be one of the most competitive ever in the NBA.

With a SD of .098, 1976-77 is the most competitive season since the merger.  It's no accident that it happened the first year after the merger, for reasons discussed above.  For the second straight season, only one NBA team finished below .300, the New York Nets.  Meanwhile, the other ABA transfers did better, with San Antonio and Denver posting solid above .500 seasons (Denver, in fact, won their division), and Indiana finishing 36-46.  No one really stood out in 1976, however, with the 53-29 Lakers the class of the league.

This was no diluted league, however, and while the lack of great teams might frustrate some, there was no shortage of great players.  Take a look at some of the leader boards to see what I mean:

Points:
1) Pete Maravich - New Orleans
2) Kareem Abdul-Jabaar - Los Angeles
3) David Thompson - Denver
4) Billy Knight - Indiana
5) Elvin Hayes - Washington

Rebounds:
1) Kareem - Los Angeles
2) Moses Malone - Houston
3) Artis Gillmore - Chicago
4) Elvin Hayes - Washington
5) Bill Walton - Portland

Win Shares:
1) Kareem - Los Angeles
2) Gilmore - Chicago
3) Hayes - Washington
4) Dr. J - Philadelphia
5) Bobby Jones - Denver

Not even mentioned in those statistical categories are first team All-NBA-er Paul Westphal and 2nd teamers George Gervin, Geroge McGinnis, and Jo Jo White.  Rookie of the Year Adrian Dantley, All-Stars Dan Issel, Bob Lanier, Rick Barry, Dave Cowens, John Havlicek, Bob McAdoo, Rudy Tomjanovich, and Earl Monroe are also worth mentioning.  In short, it was a banner year, talent-wise, for the NBA.  It just so happened that few of those players were teammates (Issel, Bobby Jones, and David Thompson with Denver were possibly the best trio in the league, but not good enough to get past Bill Walton's eventual champion Portland).

The NBA continued to see parity in 1977-78 (SD of .111) and 1978-79 (SD of .103), but eventually we settled into a happy medium as Larry Bird and Moses Malone came into their own in the early 80s, followed, of course, by MJ.

Modern Era - 1990s and Beyond 

There's not as much to say about the NBA since the merger.  As the three-point line became and accepted part of the game, and as free agency settled in and the draft became what it is today, changes to the league structure have become much smaller.  As you can see in the graph, there's a much narrower range of variability from one season to another in the modern NBA, and that's probably a better measure of competitiveness than anything else.  The modern NBA has struck a balance, for the most part, between too few and too many teams being in contention each season, with room for the occasional extreme.

A couple noteworthy seasons include 1983-84 and 2006-07 (with SDs of .115 and .132, respectively), which were both on the "competitive" end of our SD spectrum.  1983 was Bird's first MVP season, featuring a - guess who? - Los Angeles vs. Boston finals.  While no team really pulled away, both Boston and Los Angeles were excellent, and the SD is so low mainly because no team was truly awful.  The 27-55 Chicago Bulls, of course, were one of the league's worst, and bad enough to land none other than Michael Jordan in the draft the next season (at #3 overall).*

* This was a crazy, crazy draft.  Check out some of the picks, here:
1) Hakeem Olajuwon - Houston
2) Greg Oden - Portland.  Oops, I meant Sam Bowie.  It's just, they're exactly the same player.  And, just like with Kevin Durant, the next guy was maybe a little better.
3) Michael Jordan - Chicago
4) Sam Perkins - Dallas 
5) Charles Barkley - Philadelphia 
7) Alvin Robertson - San Antonio
9) Otis Thorpe - Kansas City 
11) Kevin Willis - Atlanta
16) John Stockton - Utah

2006-07, meanwhile, was a parity hodge-podge, both for teams and for players.  Dirk Nowitzki won the MVP because, hey, why not?  And then his Dallas team proceeded to get dismantled by the eight-seed Golden State Warriors in the first round.  So that was maybe a bad choice.  Meanwhile the Spurs and boring Tim Duncan coasted through the regular season (finishing 58-24, which is pretty good for coasting) only to absolutely dominate the playoffs, beating Denver 4-1, Phoenix 4-2, Utah 4-1, and sweeping LeBron's Cavaliers in the finals.  Much as I hate the Spurs, Tim Duncan is, you know, really really good, and was at his best (or close) in 2006-07.

Our last two notable seasons are 1996-97 and 1997-98, responsible for two of the higher SDs in league history at .191 and .189.  These were the last two seasons of the Jordan Bulls, whose dominance in the East was matched by - in the regular season anyway - the Stockton-Malone-Ostertag (joke) Jazz in the West.  The NBA was kind of on cruise control in the late 90s.  Parity was at an all-time low - at least since the merger - but no one seemed to mind that Utah, Miami, Chicago, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Houston were winning at or above 60 games a season while the rest of the league was mediocre or terrible.  The NBA brass had to be happy, at least, because New York was at least decent, for most of the decade, meaning the huge media markets of Chicago, LA, and New York were drawing viewership, while Utah was a nice wrinkle and a good foil to the Bulls.  That is, they were good enough to win a game or two, but not good enough to really challenge for the title as long as Jordan had at least one leg.

Conclusion

Diving into individual seasons and eras tells more about the methodology I've been using than the results.  The fact is, competitiveness is subjective, and while some people will prefer parity, others prefer leagues like those of the late 90s, when parity is non-existent because a small handful of teams dominate every year.  The fact is, either type of league can be successful.  In Europe, the Premiership and other soccer leagues are routinely extremely top-heavy.  When was the last time someone not named Chelsea, Manchester United, or Arsenal won the EPL?  Answer: Blackburn Rovers in 1994-95 (during Alan Shearer's prime)*.  Yeah.  And yet, people keep watching even though the same three teams are at the top every year.

* And no, I won't apologize to other Americans for knowing who Alan Shearer is.

I would argue, though, that the EPL is supremely competitive for exactly that reason: there are a small set of teams that must get a result basically every match.  Then there are a lot of other teams that are also well-matched, and while they're not fighting for the league title, they are trying to avoid relegation, or climb high enough to qualify for the Euro Cup, if not the European Champions League.  The same is more or less true in the NBA.  While, realistically, it's hard to win a seven game series against superior opposition, there's still plenty of incentive - in revenue, principally - to make the playoffs, and for better teams there's the incentive of home-court advantage that drives competition throughout the regular season.

If anything, the biggest flaw in the NBA's competitiveness in the modern era - the real cause of the larger SDs we see now - is not dilution, league size, free agency, or the salary cap.  I'm sure those things contribute, but I think the biggest culprit is incentive: there's undeniably incentive for good teams to win games, but there's also incentive for bad teams to lose games.  Because the NBA draft lottery is designed to give inferior teams a better chance at higher picks, tanking is all-too common, and tanking has as much effect on standard deviations of winning percentage as title chasing does.  If only the NBA had a relegation system!  But that's a post for another time.

Tuesday, February 8, 2011

NBA League Size and Competitiveness, Part Two: The Data

"Errors using inadequate data are much less than those using no data at all." - Charles Babbage

That is the spirit with which this post will proceed.  The question we're trying to get at is whether or not a larger league in the NBA (or, really, in any sport) leads to a more "diluted" product.  I've reinterpreted this question to be the following: is the league more or less competitive when there are more teams?  As discussed in Part One, it's not easy to really tell where the overall talent level of a league is because all the statistics players compile - all the games they play, the championships team win, and so on - are contextual.  The best player from the 1950s was still the best player from the 1950s, and looks great in retrospect, even if he wouldn't even make an NBA roster today.

Therefore, I transformed "diluted" into "competitive," because it seems to me that the one stands for the other.  That is, when we think the league is diluted, what we're really saying is that the league is not competitive, that there are too many players who are not good enough to hang with the few good ones, and that the few good ones are causing a small set of teams to dominate.  In a non-diluted league - in a competitive league - "everyone has a good team," to use Bill Simmons's language from my last post.  The result, no one - or few people - have a team that just trounces everyone else.

So today we're going to make a first pass at the data.  That first pass?  Looking, simply, at the standard deviation of winning percentage for each year in NBA (and ABA) history.  When was the league the most competitive (smallest standard deviation), when was it the least competitive (largest standard deviation), and is there any discernible trend as the league expands (does a larger league tend to be more or less competitive)?  Without further ado, here's a graph of our results.  X-axis is number of teams, Y-axis is standard deviation of winning percentage.

X is number of teams, Y is standard deviation of winning percentage

As you can see, there is a slight upwards trend here, but it's pretty small.  The R value (R-squard is on the graph) is about 0.17, which is not really significant unless you're doing social sciences research.  Nevertheless, a big reason why our correlation is so small is how spread out the standard deviations of winning percentage were when there were only eight to ten teams in the league.  As you can see, the left-most data points are much, much more spread out than the rightmost, with values ranging from barely over 0.05 all the way to almost 0.20.  What does this mean?  It means that, in the league's most competitive season a mere 5% separated average teams from good teams, and almost everyone was within 10%.  Put in sports-fan friendly terms, the best winning percentage in the league was about .600, while the worst was about .400.  That's baseball territory.  On the other hand, in the least competitive season, the separation led to a best team with an .800 winning percentage and a worst team with a .200 winning percentage.  Now, that's not precise (we'll get into the exact numbers shortly), but that's roughly what standard deviation tells you.

So, back when there were only eight professional teams, there was a huge variety from year to year.  Of course, with only eight teams we expect more variety in standard deviation, because, hey, fewer data points means each data point has more influence.  Thus, if one team wins 90% of their games one season in an eight team league, that value is going to skew the overall standard deviation much more than if one team wins 90% of their games in a 30 team league.  And, indeed, the 95-96 Chicago Bulls (who went 72-10) did not make 95-96 anywhere close to one of the least competitive seasons in NBA history.  Had that happened in 1960, the story would have been different.  For example, one of the "least competitive" - by standard deviation of winning percentage - seasons in NBA history was 1952, when a 12-57 Philadelphia team joined a 16-54 Baltimore team to drag the whole league down.

If we take only the seasons since the merger - that is, only seasons in which the league has more than 20 teams, we get the following instead:


Now we have an R value of .46, which is getting much closer to significant.  Indeed, while random variation obviously plays a huge roll - as do hard-to-quantify things like player skill and pre-NBA training, as well as injury management and so on - there seems to be little doubt that larger leagues are at least somewhat less competitive, according to standard deviation of winning percentage.  Consider that there have been only five seasons in which the SD of winning percentage was under 0.15 since the league went to 25 teams in 1988, whereas there were over 20 such seasons in the 40 years before then.

What this really shows, though, is not competitiveness or dilution, but talent distribution.  That is, regardless of the level of talent in the league at any given time, the more spread out that talent is, the lower the standard deviation of winning percentage will be.  The more concentrated, conversely, the higher the standard deviation of winning percentage will be.  Whether this is a measure of dilution is up for debate.  Also, while in a smaller league a larger standard deviation here might mean less competitiveness (one or maybe two dominant teams), in a 30 team league it might be exactly what we want (5 or 6 really good teams).

For example, this season the Miami Heat have Dwayne Wade, LeBron James, and Chris Bosh.  The Los Angeles Lakers have Lamar Odom, Kobe Bryant, and Pau Gasol.  The Boston Celtics have Kevin Garnett, Paul Pierce, Ray Allen, and Rajon Rondo.  Now, any of those ten players would be the best or second best player on most other teams.  Whether because of finances, smarts, collusion, or some combination of factors, we're currently watching a league where talent has conglomerated onto a small set of teams that routinely beat up on inferior opposition.  While I didn't run the (still changing) numbers from this season's NBA, so far there's a team with an .840 winning percentage (San Antonio), three teams above .700 (Dallas, Miami, Boston), and six more teams above .600 (Chicago, Atlanta, Orlando, Oklahoma City, Los Angeles, New Orleans).  On the other side of the coin, there's a .154 Cleveland team, plus five other teams below .300 (Sacramento, Minnesota, Washington, Toronto, and New Jersey).

Is this season's NBA competitive or not?  There are, at this point, ten legitimately good teams, any of whom - given the right breaks - could win the NBA Finals.  That sounds extremely competitive to me.  On the other hand, there are also at least six teams that are flat out awful, meaning that a large portion of each day's games are over before they start.  Is Cleveland really going to beat Miami?  Does Minnesota stand a chance against Oklahoma City?  Even though upsets happen, I doubt any circumstance would arise where a fan would feel like one of those inferior teams really deserved to beat one of the top ones.  They would need lots of lucky breaks.  And that, I think, is a mark of an uncompetitive league, when the bottom third of the league stands little to no chance against the top third.

But wait.  Does that mean the league is uncompetitive, or does it just mean that talent is distributed unevenly?  The latter is certainly true.  The former is more a question of taste and perspective.  We could say the same about the league being diluted.  When it comes down to it, if you make the league smaller, players who seemed great in a 30 team league will look good, and players who seemed good will look average.  Does that mean the league is better or worse?  Or does it mean that our perspective changes?

Consider a historical example.  When the ABA and the NBA merged for the 1976-1977 season, the NBA had one of its least competitive seasons ever, with a standard deviation of winning percentage under .100.  Bill Simmons says, in The Book of Basketball, that this one time the league actually under-expanded, as the 18 teams from the NBA and the 8 remaining viable teams from the ABA became 22 instead of 26.  That meant that a lot of ABA talent got redistributed to (mostly) bad NBA teams, meaning that talent was distributed about as evenly as ever in the history of the league.  The 53-29 Lakers lead the NBA that season, with a 50-32 Denver and 50-32 Philadelphia on their heels.  Those were the only three teams that won 60% of their games or more.

So where does 1976-77 sit in terms of dilution, competitiveness, and distribution of talent?  Really, we can only answer the ladder.  Talent was widely distributed.  Was the league diluted?  Was it competitive?  That's a matter of opinion.  Because talent was widely distributed, it was certainly competitive in a broad sense, but many fans would rather see great teams (and, by extension, terrible teams) than good ones (and merely bad ones).  As far as dilution, that's a more complicated question still.

See, when the league goes from 8 teams to, say, 12 teams, we'll tend to think of it as diluted because players who weren't previously good enough now are.  Similarly, contraction seems to eliminate dilution, because suddenly all of those marginal players are gone.  But give it ten years after expansion and contraction, and we no longer feel that way, because it's a matter of perspective and perception.  If the NBA cut 10 teams this offseason, the result would definitely be a short-term feeling of "raising the level" of the league, and probably increased competitiveness in the sense of a smaller standard deviation of winning percentages.  However, after 10 seasons of the new, 20 team NBA, we'd get used to seeing guys who had previously been their team's #1 as role players on the "deeper" teams in the smaller league.  New draft picks who once would have been franchise guys for bad teams would suddenly never be at the top of the league.  These new would-be stars, however, would never be thought of as franchise players who turned into role players.  We'd just consider them role players.  Suddenly, over time, the league would start to look a lot like it does now, only with fewer teams.

The same goes in the other direction.  A more diluted league is all well and good to talk about, but no one talks about how diluted NCAA Division I college basketball is, despite the fact that it adds new teams almost every year.  Sure, talent distribution is pretty extreme in the NCAA, but even so there are usually a good 20 or so teams that have a legitimate chance to win the Tourney every season (if you think this is an exaggeration, consider Butler), given the right breaks, and a favorable series of match-ups in March Madness.  Is the NCAA diluted?  Maybe, in some sense, but in another sense it's almost a crazy question to ask.

I would argue the same is true in the NBA.  Is the NBA diluted or not?  That's not really a good question, because being diluted is relative, and the stats players compile are relative, and even wins and losses are relative.  Bill Simmons believes the NBA is diluted because he grew up watching a league with a dozen teams in it.  I don't, because I grew up watching a league with 27-30 teams in it.  NCAA fans are used to the 400-something Division I teams, so there's never really a discussion.

What we do have, however, are some interesting measures of talent distribution and, in some sense, competitiveness.  We've already seen the trend - as the league expands, there is both a tightening up of standard deviations of winning percentage (less variety from season to season), and a slight (very slight) upwards trend.  Next time, we'll dive a little deeper into that data and look at some of the outlier seasons.  Moreover, we haven't given up on the competitiveness question - when has the league been most competitive? With more teams or with fewer? - so we're going to tease out only the good teams and run the same analysis here on them (that is, how many good teams are there in a season, and how good are they).  Stay tuned.